SAYANORA
As much as I'd hate to miss my second Republican convention in as many elections (I had the pleasure of spending the summer in my hometown for the 2000 GOP love-in) I'm off to wonderful Nippon for two weeks for my honeymoon. And to make sure I don't miss anything important, the VCR is programmed to tape an entire week of the best political coverage on TV - The Daily Show.
Tasty commentary on politics, law, religion and more, without the fattening dogma. (The views expressed on this blog are the author's alone, and do not represent those of any past, current or future employer or his past, current, and future soulmate.)
August 26, 2004
August 24, 2004
BUSH & KERRY ON IRAQ: BEYOND RECKLESS vs. FECKLESS
Recent presidential campaigns have demonstrated that you can count on the mainstream media for two things. The first, is that it will happily glom on to whatever substance-free issue comes its way to avoid any discussion of actual substantive issues. The second is that to the extent substance is discussed, it is transmitted through an uncritically accepted conceptual framework. Thus, once the motif of Stupid But Sincere Bush against Smart but Calculating Gore was established, anything that played against it (such as blatant lying by Bush on his tax plan) was downplayed, while anything that played to it (any repositioning on any issue no matter how slight by Gore)emphasized.
With respect to this campaign, on Iraq, the conventional wisdom is Bush is reckless while Kerry is feckless. And any inconvenient facts that may suggest either pragmatism/wobbling from Bush or resolution/rigidity from Kerry are ignored.
Kerry: Mostly Feckless
As liberal pundits have noted, Kerry's position on the war is not as inconsistent as the simplistic version of it offered in the media. Kerry saw his as vote as empowering Bush to bargain from a position of strength, and use force only after diplomacy failed. Thus, by only going through the motions diplomatic, Bush did things "the wrong way" and Kerry is not inconsistent in opposing the war that Bush actually fought.
However, consistency and coherency are two different things, and Kerry's proceduarlist critique is maddeningly vague. At no point does Kerry answer the relevant questions his position begs to be answered: how much time should the weapons inspections been given to verify the state of the Iraqi WMD production? How much abuse of the inspections process would he have tolerated before deciding to use force? Should a tightened sanctions regime have been the alternate in the event that the inspectors found no smoking guns, but did no received total cooperation from the Hussein regime? How should a president have handled differences of opinion with other nations as to these questions - especially from the French and others who were not negotiating themselves in good faith? Will Kerry ever answer these questions before November? Will he even be ASKED these questions? Highly doubtful.)
Bush: From Reckless to Feckless
Whatever problems the media has with accurately portraying Kerry's position on Iraq pales in comparison to its reporting on what the Bush administration has actually done there. Both liberal and conservative pundits alike portray the Bush administration as holding a unilateralist, idealist course throughout the whole Iraq process. Thus liberals decry Bush as reckless, ideologically radical (wedded to the vision of the Neocons), and completely unable to admit, let alone adapt to unanticipated circumstances. Conservatives portray Bush as dynamic, decisive, steadfast and morally grounded in holding the course he set out in 2002. What's fascinating is that both the standard attack and defense of Bush's Iraq policy has become so fixed, so ritualized that they pretty much ignore anything the administration has done over the past 12 months.
The reality is that since May 2003, while the Bush Administration's neocon/Wilsonian rhetoric has stayed the same, on the ground it has reversed itself in numerous areas, subordinating the goal of producing a functioning Iraqi democracy to the goal of shortening the occupation to a politically palatable level. In order to carry out this fundamentally Jacksonian policy, the Administration turned to the Hamiltonian experts at State and elsewhere to facilitate it.
The appointment of Bremer in May 2003 marked the beginning of this shift, but Bremer himself was responsible for disbanding of the Iraqi army in the name of de-Baathification. The real change came in October, with the reorganization of Iraq policy. Unilateral idealism was out, multilateral pragmatism was in, for better or worse. Opposition to U.N. involvement melted, transfer of sovereignty to a Iraqi government was pushed ahead of elections, anti-democratic militias in Falluja and Najaf were left intact to preserve short-term stability, Ahmed Chalabi went from ally to target. Were some of these new policies prudent? Perhaps. Cautious? Definitely. Reckless? Definitely not. A reckless crusader for democracy would have doubled down, sent in more troops and rode out the short-term criticism to present a better environment for Iraq's first elections. A purist, ideologue would have not handed over the government to a former Baathist strongman.
Both liberal and conservative pundits however would rather peddle the convenient myth of neocon consistency. For liberals, now enamored with realism, doing so would force them to admit that Bush has adopted much of their platform over the past year, and for them to face the consequences of what they advocated. For conservative idealists, facing Bush's last year squarely forces them to face just how far they have fallen, and the very real weaknesses of their hero. But the truth is Bush has been reckless & feckless. And Iraqis and Americans alike will be paying in the future just as much for the "solutions" offered by realist wise-men as they will for the problems created by neocon hubris.
Recent presidential campaigns have demonstrated that you can count on the mainstream media for two things. The first, is that it will happily glom on to whatever substance-free issue comes its way to avoid any discussion of actual substantive issues. The second is that to the extent substance is discussed, it is transmitted through an uncritically accepted conceptual framework. Thus, once the motif of Stupid But Sincere Bush against Smart but Calculating Gore was established, anything that played against it (such as blatant lying by Bush on his tax plan) was downplayed, while anything that played to it (any repositioning on any issue no matter how slight by Gore)emphasized.
With respect to this campaign, on Iraq, the conventional wisdom is Bush is reckless while Kerry is feckless. And any inconvenient facts that may suggest either pragmatism/wobbling from Bush or resolution/rigidity from Kerry are ignored.
Kerry: Mostly Feckless
As liberal pundits have noted, Kerry's position on the war is not as inconsistent as the simplistic version of it offered in the media. Kerry saw his as vote as empowering Bush to bargain from a position of strength, and use force only after diplomacy failed. Thus, by only going through the motions diplomatic, Bush did things "the wrong way" and Kerry is not inconsistent in opposing the war that Bush actually fought.
However, consistency and coherency are two different things, and Kerry's proceduarlist critique is maddeningly vague. At no point does Kerry answer the relevant questions his position begs to be answered: how much time should the weapons inspections been given to verify the state of the Iraqi WMD production? How much abuse of the inspections process would he have tolerated before deciding to use force? Should a tightened sanctions regime have been the alternate in the event that the inspectors found no smoking guns, but did no received total cooperation from the Hussein regime? How should a president have handled differences of opinion with other nations as to these questions - especially from the French and others who were not negotiating themselves in good faith? Will Kerry ever answer these questions before November? Will he even be ASKED these questions? Highly doubtful.)
Bush: From Reckless to Feckless
Whatever problems the media has with accurately portraying Kerry's position on Iraq pales in comparison to its reporting on what the Bush administration has actually done there. Both liberal and conservative pundits alike portray the Bush administration as holding a unilateralist, idealist course throughout the whole Iraq process. Thus liberals decry Bush as reckless, ideologically radical (wedded to the vision of the Neocons), and completely unable to admit, let alone adapt to unanticipated circumstances. Conservatives portray Bush as dynamic, decisive, steadfast and morally grounded in holding the course he set out in 2002. What's fascinating is that both the standard attack and defense of Bush's Iraq policy has become so fixed, so ritualized that they pretty much ignore anything the administration has done over the past 12 months.
The reality is that since May 2003, while the Bush Administration's neocon/Wilsonian rhetoric has stayed the same, on the ground it has reversed itself in numerous areas, subordinating the goal of producing a functioning Iraqi democracy to the goal of shortening the occupation to a politically palatable level. In order to carry out this fundamentally Jacksonian policy, the Administration turned to the Hamiltonian experts at State and elsewhere to facilitate it.
The appointment of Bremer in May 2003 marked the beginning of this shift, but Bremer himself was responsible for disbanding of the Iraqi army in the name of de-Baathification. The real change came in October, with the reorganization of Iraq policy. Unilateral idealism was out, multilateral pragmatism was in, for better or worse. Opposition to U.N. involvement melted, transfer of sovereignty to a Iraqi government was pushed ahead of elections, anti-democratic militias in Falluja and Najaf were left intact to preserve short-term stability, Ahmed Chalabi went from ally to target. Were some of these new policies prudent? Perhaps. Cautious? Definitely. Reckless? Definitely not. A reckless crusader for democracy would have doubled down, sent in more troops and rode out the short-term criticism to present a better environment for Iraq's first elections. A purist, ideologue would have not handed over the government to a former Baathist strongman.
Both liberal and conservative pundits however would rather peddle the convenient myth of neocon consistency. For liberals, now enamored with realism, doing so would force them to admit that Bush has adopted much of their platform over the past year, and for them to face the consequences of what they advocated. For conservative idealists, facing Bush's last year squarely forces them to face just how far they have fallen, and the very real weaknesses of their hero. But the truth is Bush has been reckless & feckless. And Iraqis and Americans alike will be paying in the future just as much for the "solutions" offered by realist wise-men as they will for the problems created by neocon hubris.
August 20, 2004
NO WILSONIAN CONSENSUS
It is tempting as a Wilsonian, to make the claim that in contrast to the Realist views of the foreign policy establishment, the American public is decidedly Wilsonian. This is how OxBlogger Patrick Belton optimistically reads
a recent PEW/Council of Foreign Relations poll on the American public's view of foreign policy.
As Daniel Drezner (another Wilsonian) notes, this finding doesn't quite jibe with the rankings on actual foreign policy issues, which place promoting democracy & improving living standards in poor nations dead last on a list of 19 priorities.
I agree, somewhat. However, there is still the question of how to explain the 72% "moral principle" figure? First, I think this poll is a perfect example of where setting out a Wilsonian (as a proxy for idealist)/realist dichotomy breaks down, and once again it is preferential to use Walter Russell Mead's categorization of the four American foreign policy traditions.
The mere advocacy of a "moral" foreign policy does not make somebody a Wilsonian. There also needs to be a commitment to American promotion of universal values such as democracy and human rights (the means - unilateral or multilateral is what Wilsonians can disagree about). Thus, the size of the American public who can be fairly characterized as having principally a Wilsonian view of foreign policy correlates with the 24% who place democracy-promotion as a top priority (which by the way matches up roughly with the 25% who value idealism).
In addition to Wilsonians, the 72% figure also encompasses Jeffersonians, who also believe in a "moral" foreign policy. The difference is that they believe America acts morally when it does not utilize its military against weaker nations, is respectful of cultural difference, and does not provide aid to "immoral" regimes. No doubt the 72% also includes a number of Jacksonians who believe America has a "moral" obligation to defend its friends, and to exact vengeance upon its enemies. Finally the number includes those who can be said to have any principle foreign policy orientation.
So in order to get a better sense of the relative strengths of the different orientations, I repeated Drezner's exercise with the list of concrete foreign policy objectives, but instead using Mead's classification(Wilsonian-Wil;Hamiltoninan-Ham;Jeffersonian-Jef;Jacksonian-Jax).
Obviously, some of my assignments are open to debate, and most Americans do not neatly fall into any one category. But it seems to me that a plurality of the American public holds primarily Jacksonian views, which explains why there has been so much pandering in that direction by both candidates. Although there is a clear difference here, in that while Bush has actually conducted an especially Jacksonian foreign policy (with its tough rhetoric and disdain for world opinion), Kerry, who would conduct a foreign policy that was anything but Jacksonian, has to rely on symbolic appeals based on his military record).
The other three groups, at least with respect to those who hold these views as primary appear to be roughly equivalent. However, the appeal of issues such as the global AIDS crisis and global hunger suggests that there is a large amount of secondary, soft support for Wilsonian ideas that is not present for the other two groups. I believe it is this combination - the breadth of support for Wilsonian ideas combined by the softness of that support - that explains why advocates for a more ambitious Wilsonian agenda believe they have widespread support, only to find that support to be fickle and fleeting.
It is tempting as a Wilsonian, to make the claim that in contrast to the Realist views of the foreign policy establishment, the American public is decidedly Wilsonian. This is how OxBlogger Patrick Belton optimistically reads
a recent PEW/Council of Foreign Relations poll on the American public's view of foreign policy.
Interestingly, it also shows the American public is solidly Wilsonian, with 72 percent believing the top priority for American foreign policy is to follow moral principles
As Daniel Drezner (another Wilsonian) notes, this finding doesn't quite jibe with the rankings on actual foreign policy issues, which place promoting democracy & improving living standards in poor nations dead last on a list of 19 priorities.
These results bolster a thesis that I've been cogitating on for the past few months: despite claims by international relations theorists -- including most realists -- that the overwhelming majority of Americans hold liberal policy preferences, it just ain't so. Even if those beliefs are extolled in the abstract, when asked to prioritize among different foreign policy tasks, the realist position wins.
I agree, somewhat. However, there is still the question of how to explain the 72% "moral principle" figure? First, I think this poll is a perfect example of where setting out a Wilsonian (as a proxy for idealist)/realist dichotomy breaks down, and once again it is preferential to use Walter Russell Mead's categorization of the four American foreign policy traditions.
The mere advocacy of a "moral" foreign policy does not make somebody a Wilsonian. There also needs to be a commitment to American promotion of universal values such as democracy and human rights (the means - unilateral or multilateral is what Wilsonians can disagree about). Thus, the size of the American public who can be fairly characterized as having principally a Wilsonian view of foreign policy correlates with the 24% who place democracy-promotion as a top priority (which by the way matches up roughly with the 25% who value idealism).
In addition to Wilsonians, the 72% figure also encompasses Jeffersonians, who also believe in a "moral" foreign policy. The difference is that they believe America acts morally when it does not utilize its military against weaker nations, is respectful of cultural difference, and does not provide aid to "immoral" regimes. No doubt the 72% also includes a number of Jacksonians who believe America has a "moral" obligation to defend its friends, and to exact vengeance upon its enemies. Finally the number includes those who can be said to have any principle foreign policy orientation.
So in order to get a better sense of the relative strengths of the different orientations, I repeated Drezner's exercise with the list of concrete foreign policy objectives, but instead using Mead's classification(Wilsonian-Wil;Hamiltoninan-Ham;Jeffersonian-Jef;Jacksonian-Jax).
Protect against terrorist attacks -- 88 (all)
Protect jobs of American workers -- 84 (Jax;Jef)
Reduce spread of AIDS & other diseases -- 72 (Wil)
Stop spread of weapons of mass destruction -- 71 (Ham;Jax;Wil)
Insure adequate energy supplies -- 70 (Ham;Jax)
Reduce dependence on foreign oil -- 63 (Jef;Jax)
Combat international drug trafficking -- 63 (Jef;Ham)
Distribute costs of maintaining world order -- 58 (Ham;Jax)
Improve relationships with allies -- 54 (Ham;Jef)
Deal with problem of world hunger -- 50 (Wil)
Strengthen the United Nations -- 48 (Ham;Wil)
Protect groups threatened with genocide -- 47 (Wil)
Deal with global warming -- 36 (Jef)
Reduce U.S. military commitments -- 35 (Jef)
Promote U.S. business interests abroad -- 35 (Ham)
Promote human rights abroad -- 33 (Wil;Jef)
Solve Israeli/ Palestinian conflict -- 28 (Ham;Wil)
Promote democracy abroad -- 24 (Wil)
Improve living standards in poor nations -- 23 (Wil)
Obviously, some of my assignments are open to debate, and most Americans do not neatly fall into any one category. But it seems to me that a plurality of the American public holds primarily Jacksonian views, which explains why there has been so much pandering in that direction by both candidates. Although there is a clear difference here, in that while Bush has actually conducted an especially Jacksonian foreign policy (with its tough rhetoric and disdain for world opinion), Kerry, who would conduct a foreign policy that was anything but Jacksonian, has to rely on symbolic appeals based on his military record).
The other three groups, at least with respect to those who hold these views as primary appear to be roughly equivalent. However, the appeal of issues such as the global AIDS crisis and global hunger suggests that there is a large amount of secondary, soft support for Wilsonian ideas that is not present for the other two groups. I believe it is this combination - the breadth of support for Wilsonian ideas combined by the softness of that support - that explains why advocates for a more ambitious Wilsonian agenda believe they have widespread support, only to find that support to be fickle and fleeting.
August 11, 2004
I DIDN'T SERVE WITH JOHN KERRY IN VIETNAM SO YOU SHOULD PROBABLY JUST TUNE ME OUT
Here are my thoughts on the whole Kerry Swiftboat nonsense
1) If you were voting for John Kerry because he won 3 people hearts in Vietnam, you're a moron
2) If you are no longer voting for John Kerry because you believe the attack ads against his Vietnam record, you're a gullible moron
3) If you produced the attack ads against John Kerry's Vietnam record, you're a sleazebag.
4) If you are making the argument that the real issue is John Kerry's veracity and therefore this inquiry into possibly exagerrated claims in his war record is really is a salient issue, you are either a soulless GOP shill, an easy mark for GOP shills, or fundamentally unserious about politics.
Look, I find the whole Kerry war-hero schtick highly problematic. First, because as it has indicated all along, the Democratic Party views national security primarily through the lens of politics, as if it were akin to gay marriage or some other cultural wedge issue that Republicans like to play whenever they are afraid working-class voters might actually realize how badly their policies screw them. So Kerry was chosen precisely with the current strategy he is now employing in mind.
The way Kerry baldly uses his personal heroism to deflect any concerns about his Jeffersonian foreign policy vision that he has consistently espoused (except when prompted by poltical necessity) for his entire public life should be fair game. But not the heroism itself. It is not only a cynical degredation of the public debate, but it exposes the very real fact that the Bushies aren't confident that they can win the national security debate substantively. When you consider the staggering record of incompetence left behind by Bush's four years, its not surprising that Rove has already turned to character assasination. After all, Kerry may not take the country where we need to go to defeat Islamist fundamentalism, but at least he'll get it wherever he's going in one piece.
John Kerry - He won't win the war on terror, but at least he won't lose it. Or something like that.
Here are my thoughts on the whole Kerry Swiftboat nonsense
1) If you were voting for John Kerry because he won 3 people hearts in Vietnam, you're a moron
2) If you are no longer voting for John Kerry because you believe the attack ads against his Vietnam record, you're a gullible moron
3) If you produced the attack ads against John Kerry's Vietnam record, you're a sleazebag.
4) If you are making the argument that the real issue is John Kerry's veracity and therefore this inquiry into possibly exagerrated claims in his war record is really is a salient issue, you are either a soulless GOP shill, an easy mark for GOP shills, or fundamentally unserious about politics.
Look, I find the whole Kerry war-hero schtick highly problematic. First, because as it has indicated all along, the Democratic Party views national security primarily through the lens of politics, as if it were akin to gay marriage or some other cultural wedge issue that Republicans like to play whenever they are afraid working-class voters might actually realize how badly their policies screw them. So Kerry was chosen precisely with the current strategy he is now employing in mind.
The way Kerry baldly uses his personal heroism to deflect any concerns about his Jeffersonian foreign policy vision that he has consistently espoused (except when prompted by poltical necessity) for his entire public life should be fair game. But not the heroism itself. It is not only a cynical degredation of the public debate, but it exposes the very real fact that the Bushies aren't confident that they can win the national security debate substantively. When you consider the staggering record of incompetence left behind by Bush's four years, its not surprising that Rove has already turned to character assasination. After all, Kerry may not take the country where we need to go to defeat Islamist fundamentalism, but at least he'll get it wherever he's going in one piece.
John Kerry - He won't win the war on terror, but at least he won't lose it. Or something like that.
August 01, 2004
BOSTON AND BEYOND
In watching the Democratic convention and the true start of the Bush-Kerry campaign, I can not help but escape from the feeling of detachment that plagues me. As a Dem, I usually have little trouble being fully caught up in the rhetoric and pageantry of a Democratic convention, in the drawing of sharp, clear contrasts between the two parties governing philosophies. And during moments of the this convention that was the cased. I awaited Barack Obama's speech with rapt anticipation. I was fully carried up in the excitement and passion of John Edwards's speech. Most of all, I was delighted in seeing the party's fighting spirit, and its vigorous efforts to wrest patriotism and faith away from their partisan abuse as part of the still effective GOP playbook laid out two decades earlier by Atwater. The home team has never looked more disciplined and yet more passionate. The combination of the two could be seen in John Kerry's surprisingly animated acceptance speech. Rather than play it safe, Kerry spoke from his heart and threw down the gauntlet against the Bush Administration - against its radical religious right agenda on cultural issues, against its abdication of responsibility on social issues, against its irresponsibility on economic issues and its fecklessness on foreign policy. It was the speech that liberal Dems wanted to hear - a speech that read as if it was scripted by Aaron Sorkin. (Indeed, the speech it most reminded me of was the one delivered by Michael Douglas's President in the American President.)
So where does the detachment come from, with such a stirring scene that warmed my left-of-center heart. It comes of course from the cold reality of the grim choice the nation faces on the most important issue facing it - the War on Terror. True, the Democratic Party went all out to show that it is no longer the McGovernite party it was from Carter to Dukakis. And this is heartening. It means that at least on the tactical, political level, the party understands that the War on Terror is not going to be won through appeasement and detente. Kerry, however, has made clear that while he understands he must cabin his Jeffersonian instincts, that when he does so, he will act in a Hamiltonian way. As Joshua Micah Marshall and other moderate Dems have written with approval, Kerry seeks to bring us a foreign policy that will be quite similar to that of Bush the Elder - restrained, multilateral, forceful when necessary, and above all realist.
Kerryt's Foreign Policy (and it very much will be Kerry who will be its foremost architect) It therefore a wholesale rejection of the neoconservative project, rather than a rejection of neoconservative hubris and Cheyney & Rumsfeld's use of Neocon idealism as a cover for their own Jacksonian agenda. As a Democratic Wilsonian, therefore, who believes that the War against Islamist Terror will be won only through the agressive promotion of democratic and liberal ideals in the Islamic world, this is enough to dampen my enthusiasm for the Kerry Administration. (I'm still waiting for Kerry to utter the word "Sudan"). But a second Bush term does not hold out any more hope. Iraq was the Neocon high tide, and even there they have lost out to the Jacksonian impulse to shy from the messy task of nation-building and the need to bring in the Hamiltonian State Department to clean up the mess of the post-war disaster that was in much due to the Neocon disdain for details. Neither side address the deep inadequacy of our current international institutions. Bush revels in it as an opportunity to pursue American policy unfettered, while Kerry appears to be in denial, placing the entire blame for America's strained relationship with those institutions on Bush's recklessness.
Perhaps the best thing for me to do is to focus on the positives of a Kerry Administration. Stem cell research will no longer be held hostage to the most fundamentalist views of the religious right. The Supreme Court and the lower branches of the federal judiciary will be stacked with more Breyers and less Scalias. The defecit will be reduced. There is hope for some progress on education and health care. The perils of climate change will finally be noted, and a serious plan for energy efficiency may get enacted. And with respect to the less-sexy, technocratic aspect of the War on Terror (searching port containers,tracking down loose nukes) Kerry will be more than up to the task. And if that doesn't quite stir me into the same fervor of my fellow Dems, it is enough to make the chances of my pulling the lever for Kerry in November, very, very likely.
In watching the Democratic convention and the true start of the Bush-Kerry campaign, I can not help but escape from the feeling of detachment that plagues me. As a Dem, I usually have little trouble being fully caught up in the rhetoric and pageantry of a Democratic convention, in the drawing of sharp, clear contrasts between the two parties governing philosophies. And during moments of the this convention that was the cased. I awaited Barack Obama's speech with rapt anticipation. I was fully carried up in the excitement and passion of John Edwards's speech. Most of all, I was delighted in seeing the party's fighting spirit, and its vigorous efforts to wrest patriotism and faith away from their partisan abuse as part of the still effective GOP playbook laid out two decades earlier by Atwater. The home team has never looked more disciplined and yet more passionate. The combination of the two could be seen in John Kerry's surprisingly animated acceptance speech. Rather than play it safe, Kerry spoke from his heart and threw down the gauntlet against the Bush Administration - against its radical religious right agenda on cultural issues, against its abdication of responsibility on social issues, against its irresponsibility on economic issues and its fecklessness on foreign policy. It was the speech that liberal Dems wanted to hear - a speech that read as if it was scripted by Aaron Sorkin. (Indeed, the speech it most reminded me of was the one delivered by Michael Douglas's President in the American President.)
So where does the detachment come from, with such a stirring scene that warmed my left-of-center heart. It comes of course from the cold reality of the grim choice the nation faces on the most important issue facing it - the War on Terror. True, the Democratic Party went all out to show that it is no longer the McGovernite party it was from Carter to Dukakis. And this is heartening. It means that at least on the tactical, political level, the party understands that the War on Terror is not going to be won through appeasement and detente. Kerry, however, has made clear that while he understands he must cabin his Jeffersonian instincts, that when he does so, he will act in a Hamiltonian way. As Joshua Micah Marshall and other moderate Dems have written with approval, Kerry seeks to bring us a foreign policy that will be quite similar to that of Bush the Elder - restrained, multilateral, forceful when necessary, and above all realist.
Kerryt's Foreign Policy (and it very much will be Kerry who will be its foremost architect) It therefore a wholesale rejection of the neoconservative project, rather than a rejection of neoconservative hubris and Cheyney & Rumsfeld's use of Neocon idealism as a cover for their own Jacksonian agenda. As a Democratic Wilsonian, therefore, who believes that the War against Islamist Terror will be won only through the agressive promotion of democratic and liberal ideals in the Islamic world, this is enough to dampen my enthusiasm for the Kerry Administration. (I'm still waiting for Kerry to utter the word "Sudan"). But a second Bush term does not hold out any more hope. Iraq was the Neocon high tide, and even there they have lost out to the Jacksonian impulse to shy from the messy task of nation-building and the need to bring in the Hamiltonian State Department to clean up the mess of the post-war disaster that was in much due to the Neocon disdain for details. Neither side address the deep inadequacy of our current international institutions. Bush revels in it as an opportunity to pursue American policy unfettered, while Kerry appears to be in denial, placing the entire blame for America's strained relationship with those institutions on Bush's recklessness.
Perhaps the best thing for me to do is to focus on the positives of a Kerry Administration. Stem cell research will no longer be held hostage to the most fundamentalist views of the religious right. The Supreme Court and the lower branches of the federal judiciary will be stacked with more Breyers and less Scalias. The defecit will be reduced. There is hope for some progress on education and health care. The perils of climate change will finally be noted, and a serious plan for energy efficiency may get enacted. And with respect to the less-sexy, technocratic aspect of the War on Terror (searching port containers,tracking down loose nukes) Kerry will be more than up to the task. And if that doesn't quite stir me into the same fervor of my fellow Dems, it is enough to make the chances of my pulling the lever for Kerry in November, very, very likely.