THE PEJORATIVE LIKUDNIK

There's an interesting discussion going on at the Washington Monthly blog on this. Here's my take on the issue.

Two different debates are getting conflated here. First, whether or not the increasing use of the term "Likudnik" in American political discourse is fueled by anti-Semitism and second, a larger question about at what point does legitimate critcism of Israeli policies cross the line into anti-Semitism.

Getting back to the original question, it is important to ask what "Likudnik" is supposed to connote in the American context. I'm pretty confident that most of the people who throw the term around are unfamiliar with the writings of Vladimir Jabotinsky.

Here are the various ways Likudnik is employed.

1) To denote supporters of the Sharon government or the Likud party against the Israeli Left. Example: American Likudniks have no idea who to support in Sharon’s ongoing struggle with members of his own party over his Gaza plan.

2) To denote supporters of a certain ideological stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian issue. Example: Likudniks believe that the most appropriate response to Palestinian terror is to expand the growth of settlements deep in the West Bank.

Neither of these two uses is any more problematic than say calling the Israel Policy Forum "Laborites." The problem comes from attempting to transfer the term to American policies

3) To denote supporters of an American foreign policy that supports or does not object to “Likudnik” approaches to the Israeli security policy. Example: American Likudniks do not believe our government should apply any pressure on Israel to crack down on West Bank settlement expansion.

(It should be noted, that when used employed as a pejorative by leftists and liberals, it often seems to be applied to anyone who supports American backing of various Israeli policies(e.g. the border wall and targeted strikes on terrorists) that are backed by most Israelis, including those that reject the Likud’s long-term approach to the Palestinian issue and support a negotiated two-state solution.

However, the way the term seems to be employed on an increasing basis is as way of describing the Bush administration's foreign policy in the Middle East.

4) To denote supporters of a “Likudnik” approach to American foreign policy. Example: The Likudniks real reason for going to war in Iraq was a perceived need after 9/11 that America needed to send a dramatic message to the Arab-Islamic world in order to restore its lost deterrence.

This is the more sophisticated use of the term along these lines, the analysis being that the "Likudniks" have embraced the various ideological positions of Israeli Likudniks (a belief that the Arab-Islamic world responds best to shows of force and sees conciliation as weakness, and the need for regime change as a prerequisite for lasting peace in the region) and (mis)applied them to American foreign policy. This use of Likudnik in this fashion, while not anti-Semitic in itself, stretches it to the breaking point, and too easily morphs into the more pernicious form. It frankly unnecessary to look to Israeli ideology as the genesis of Rumsfeld and Cheaney's hawkish views, as there is a long home-grown tradition (what Walter Russell Mead calls Jacksonian) that explains their worldview much more directly.

This brings us, to the final way the term is employed, and that is:

5) To denote Jewish supporters of American hawkish policy in the Middle East whose views are driven not by what they believe is best for America, but rather based on their support for Israel. Example. The Bush administration’s foreign policy was hijacked by a group of Likudniks to further their narrow agenda.

The implication is plain; that these “Likudniks” have dual loyalties, and are willing to subvert the interest of America to the benefit of Israel. When used in this fashion, “Likudnik” most definitely being used as a coded form of anti-Semitism.

To the extent, Likudnik is being used to attack concrete ideas or policies; it most likely not being used in anti-Semitic fashion, but when it is thrown about without any context as a pejorative to attack individuals, odds are anti-Semitism is at the core of that attack.

CAN THE DEMS GET FAITH?


Well, with today's N.Y. Times' article on the subject, it is clear whatever number crunching remains to be done on the exit polls, the Dems initial response to the election defeat is to focus on closing the "faith" gap.


For those of us on the religious left who have been beggin the party for years to tackle this issue, I would like to extend a hearty "what took you so damn long?"


It is somewhat ironic that it is the narrow defeat of Kerry to Bush, as opposed to the down-ticket debacle that is driving this discussion. The irony comes from the fact that while Kerry's loss is far more easily attributable to his failure to close the deal on national security, the Dems tone-deafness on faith is a major reason the party is in shambles at the local, state and Congressional level. Still, progress is progress.


So how exactly is the gap to be closed?

But Democrats disagree about how to establish the party's spiritual credentials. Some play down the need for changes, saying poorly framed surveys of voters leaving polls are overstating the impact of conservative Christian voters. Others argue that Democrats need to rephrase their positions in more moral and religious language. And an emboldened group of Democratic partisans and sympathetic religious leaders warn that Mr. Bush has beaten Democrats to the middle on social issues like abortion that resonate with religious traditionalists, arguing that the party should publicly welcome opponents of abortion into its ranks and perhaps even bend in its opposition to certain abortion restrictions.

Unfortunately the article does not really do a good job of expounding any of the these alternate approaches, nor does it coherently present the contrary view of much of the party's base, represented by Jerry Nadler (D-Village) that this is much ado about nothing. What exactly does it mean to employ "moral and religious" language. Is this as simple as nominating a candidate like Carter or Clinton to whom the rhetoric comes natural, or does it require a deeper, sustained campaign to reframe what constitute "moral" or "religious" issues in American political discourse? Similarly, the article seems to suggest that moving to the middle on cultural issues is primarily about shifting positions on abortion and gay marriage. There is no mention whatsoever of the alternate approach (on which Lieberman is way ahead of the rest of the party with his approach to family leave and regulation of entertainment) of directly addressing the aspects of the culture that worry traditional voters rather than merely reacting to the issues the GOP uses to exploit that worry.


Finally, a critical limitation that often goes unexplored in these discussions is the party's absolute financial dependance on the cultural left. (Anyone who wants to understand how this dynamics works should examine the 2000 Pennsylvania Senate race, where the anti-abortion, economically liberal congressman Ron Klink, who had an excellent shot of knocking off Rick Santorum, could not raise the funds he needed to compete from the state party's pro-choice, metro Philly donor base.)


The article in passing, however, touched upon the most important thing the Dems can do to close the faith gap - building its grass-roots ties to liberal and centrist faith communities. In the end, it is the ability of the party to tap into these communities that will determine whether or not an authentic progressive faith-based agenda can be developed that can end the current disconnect from public morality to social justice.

NOT TO BE REDUCTIONIST...

But the more numbers-cruching of exit polls and analysis of vote totals I read (for example those at the Not Quite Emergerging Democratic Majority site), its more and more apparent the number one reason the Dems lost was national security. Its the best explanation for the dramatic decline among white, working-class women (maybe the security mom existed after all), its the best explanation for Bush's gains among secular voters (have you run into any rabidly homophobic atheists recently?), and its best explanation for Bush's surprising gains in Blue America (especially in New Jersey) that were essential to his winning the popular vote.


The good news for Democrats is that there is really no need to sacrifice any core principles on economic, social or cultural issues. The bad news - the Dems will need to get as tough on terror as they were on Communism during the Cold War, a move that will met with stiff resistance by much of the party's activist base (Hollywood, hard-line civil libertarians, Jeffersonian peaceniks). And even worse news for the Dems, it is by no means certain that the hawks will win.

THE DARK CLOUD OF ABU AMAR HAS PASSED


For some reason when I think of Arafat's death, I get the image of Saruman at the end of Lord of the Rings, a malevolent cloud rising into the air, hovering for a moment and then finally dispersed with a swift gust of wind from the west. Arafat will be in death as in life, more a symbol than a man. A symbol of the Arab rejection of Jewish equality and dignity and its manifestation in the state of Israel,, of the toxic romanticism of western progressives, and of the sacrifice of the very real needs of his own people and lives of countless innocent Jews on the altar of Arab and Islamic honor. With his passing, there is hope for if not peace, than tangible progress towards it.

MORE POST-ELECTION THOUGHTS


So I've read the various analyses of why the Dems lost this election, especially the fascinating selection from Slate. The problem as I see it is that there there were two losses last Tuesday: First, John Kerry's narrow loss to Bush in the Presidential election; and second, the disastrous performance of the Democrats in Congress. As a result, the Democratic party and political liberalism is from the perspective of power and influence at its lowest ebb since before FDR.


Depending upon what you foucs on - the relative parity in popularity between the two parties, or the massive gap in power, of course leads to quite different assessments as to the seriousness of the Dems problem and how radical the solution is required.


Because of the nation's rough ideological parity, the closeness of the last two presidential elections was not a mirage. This suggests that to win next time around it will simply be enough to field a candidate that can 1) relate to cultural conservatives (as opposed to the cultural reactionaries who would cast their ballot solely on the basis of gay marriage), 2) articulate an alternate national security vision (opposing wars you think are stupid and singing the praises of multilateralism doesn't count) and 3) run a better campaign with consistent themes and sharper messages.


On the other hand, the depths of the Democrats powerlessness in the absence of holding the White House suggests that a more radical fix is necessary. Part of the Dems problem is simply due to larger structural phenomena. Majoritarianism in increasy unchecked in the Congress due to computer-modeled gerrymandering and the ideological homegenization of the parties. The Dems 49$ of the vote translates into 45% of the Senate and 46% of the House. While 45% of the Senate can still hold its relative weight (for now, but watch out for GOP moves to disable the fillibuster break, especially with respect to judicial appointments), 46% of the House now attributes for about 5% of the power in a Tom Delay led GOP Congress. And in contrast to how close the Dems are to regaining the White House, the prospects for regaining either house of Congress in the near term don't look particuarly good.


First of all, the undemocratic nature of the Senate forces the disproportionately metropolitan Dem party to fight uphill. A rough cut of the nation from this past election puts us at 25 states which Bush carried easily (to be unoriginal, lets call them "Red" states) arrayed throughout the South, Plains and West, 13 states won cleanly by Kerry (the beleaguered "Blue" states) clustered on the coasts, and the 12 swing states that until the last minute could have broken either way (those finicky "Purple" states). Thus, it is very possible for the Democrats to gather support from a clear majority of the country and barely prevent a filibuster-proof GOP majority. The fact that the Dems are now at 45 is actually testament that Democrats can win in Red America. There are currently Democratic senators from Montana, Nebraska and Louisana, and 2 Democratic Senators from North Dakota, Arkansas and West Virginia. (In contrast, the GOP has only the three anachronistic New England moderates in Blue states). And until the next census and redistricting, the Dems will be fighting an uphill battle in the House as well, due to their failures at the state level.


Which lends itself naturally to what the core problem is - the Dems are losing worst at two critical levels, both at the most mundane, concrete level in terms of local and state grassroots networks, and the opposite end - in the battle of overaching vision. (What the Dems are doing perfectly fine at is developing concrete policy proposals that consistently outscore the GOP alternatives in blind taste tests) On the ground, the Dems need to do what the GOP did 20 years ago by tapping into the religious right - develop a core grass-roots organizations that will fight the critical, less glamorous fights for school board and state legislature. It is simply not enough to rely on the declining strength of organized labor (much of which is increasingly concentrated in the public sector, where it more often than not does more harm than good to progressive policies) and episodic get out the vote campaigns. In the clouds, the Dems need to settle on a set of core principals with which to combat the GOP's clearly articulated vision of "economic liberty" (tax cuts for the rich, hand-outs to big corporations, and abdication of governmental responsibity for socio-economic problems) and "public morality" (expressed through gay-baiting and the imposition of radical theological constraints on medical research). This will facilitate the Dems ability to frame debates such that their criticism of GOP policies resonates rather than alienates mainstream voters.


These are the steps that need to be taken now, so that by 2006, when mainstream America goes to the polls uncomfortable with where an unfettered Bush administration is taking the country, they will feel comfortable turning to the Democrats as a leigitimate counter-balance. Once that happens, we are well on the way to this election being anything but the epochal landslide that depressed Dems and shameless Republicans are presenting it as.

QUICK POST-MORTEM THOUGHTS ON THE ELECTION


The Dems lost a very winnable election for three main reasons: 1) they failed to establish credibility on national security issues; 2) they were unable to respond to the GOP's gay-baiting "values" approach to domestic issues; and 3) Kerry, despite the attributes of his biography (skillfully dented by the Swift Boar smear) and his tenacity (unlike Dukakis, he fought back) was simply a poor candidate.


It is tempting to say, given how Kerry came to "winning" (as opposed to the millions of votes that separated him from legitimately winning) to think that these are relatively small problems to be fixed. But that analysis ignores the palpable weakness of Bush's re-election bud. If you look further down the ticket, 2004 was a disaster for the Dems. Decades of neglecting their grassroots has led to unfavorable congressional gerrymanders that pad the radical GOP's House majority, and besides for Ken Salazar, they got shut out of all of the competitive Senate races.


To recover the Dems need to:

1) stop treating national security and the War on Terror as a wedge issue that needs to be neutralized and more as the bipartisan struggle it should be;


2) begin a major effort to reframe the values debate. There is simply no beating or even neutralizing the GOP edge if they can define public morality as gay-bashing. I give Kerry credit for trying, especially in the debates, but in the end he came off as unauthentic. The problem is not the lack of Dems with that skill - Clinton knew how to do this, and so do Edwards & Obama, it is deeper than that. The Democrats need to begin to wage a long-term campaign to recapture terms such as "family values," and they will need to brush off the large segment of their core who are likely to respond "enough with the G-d talk!!"


3) fix the friggen nomination process to increase the likelihood of getting a candidate who can communicate to the vast numbers of socially conservative (but not fundamentalist) working class voters. Right now, until I see any else who can match him in this area, I'm backing John Edwards. He now has four years to appeared to have mastered the intricacies of international affairs. I give him until the end of the year to relax with his family, and then its back to work, John, because the last thing this country needs right now is another practising lawyer.