JOE'S FSCHNIZZLE
You would think with the insurgent nature of Dean's campaign that he would be doing strongest among young voters. But according to the latest ABC/Washington Post poll that is not the case. Dean's support among Democratic primary voters drops from 31% overall to 26% among voters ages 18-30. The main beneficiary of this drop-off surprinsingly is Lieberman, who polled 9% overall, but 15% in the 18-30 bloc. The most likely reason for Liberman's added pull among younger voters is most likely not his condemnation of the moral lapses of the video game industry or his goofy "dad" jokes. On the contrary, it has everything to do with his hawkish views on national security. As opposed to the Boomers, younger voters view national security through the lens of 9/11, not Vietnam. Therefore, it is only natural that the liberal hawks might skew a bit younger.
This unease with the Dems dovishness among younger voters will have a significant impact in the general election. According to the same poll, younger voters were the only group to state a preference for Dean over Bush on domestic issues (46% to 43%, while overall voters supported Bush 50% to 39%), yet when asked who they would support in the general election, 18-30 year olds chose Bush 55% to 41% (overall Bush 55% to 37%). One more indication that not only is Lieberman's firm stance on national security essential to keep America safe from terror, it is also essential to keep America safe from four more years of the Bushies plundering the American treasury for the benefit of their corporate cronies.
Tasty commentary on politics, law, religion and more, without the fattening dogma. (The views expressed on this blog are the author's alone, and do not represent those of any past, current or future employer or his past, current, and future soulmate.)
December 23, 2003
December 16, 2003
DEAN AND DEMS FOREIGN POLICY DISASTER
There was little surprising in the speech that Howard Dean gave yesterday. It could be summed up by the photo of Warren Christopher standing in the background of the lectern - behind all of the bluster, Dean is simply a mainstream Dem who will reverse Bush's radical course and bring us back to mainstream policies of the Clinton era. The problem is, that in contrast to its excellent record on most domestic issues, on foreign policy the Clinton Administration was not an unqualified success. Sure, it handled the details of diplomacy, international trade, and important unsexy issues like securing ex-Soviet weaponry well. But on the big challenges faced by the post-Cold War era - rogue states, failed states, Islamic terror and the impotence/irrelevance of international security organizations it failed miserably to rise to the occasion with a new vision. The current Dems, with the exception of Lieberman, fail to understand this and promote policies to address an alternate reality in which the UN is functional, the Europeans are not obsessed with coralling American power and ideology is irrelevant.
There is much that is problematic with the neocons radical approach that had driven the Bush Admistration's foreign policy agenda: its impatience with details, its blanket reliance on unitilateral solutions and its ideological puritanism that have fueled out-of-control turf wars with the State/CIA realist establishment. But on the big issues - on the importance of democracy promotion and the impotence of current international institutions for global security, they are correct. Perhaps one day, the Dems will move beyond their worship of the Clinton years to develop a foreign policy agenda that will create real multilateral alternatives to the neocon's vision. Until then, the United States is better off with the semi-competent execution of the Bush Agenda than with a flawless execution of a neo-Clintonian alternative.
There was little surprising in the speech that Howard Dean gave yesterday. It could be summed up by the photo of Warren Christopher standing in the background of the lectern - behind all of the bluster, Dean is simply a mainstream Dem who will reverse Bush's radical course and bring us back to mainstream policies of the Clinton era. The problem is, that in contrast to its excellent record on most domestic issues, on foreign policy the Clinton Administration was not an unqualified success. Sure, it handled the details of diplomacy, international trade, and important unsexy issues like securing ex-Soviet weaponry well. But on the big challenges faced by the post-Cold War era - rogue states, failed states, Islamic terror and the impotence/irrelevance of international security organizations it failed miserably to rise to the occasion with a new vision. The current Dems, with the exception of Lieberman, fail to understand this and promote policies to address an alternate reality in which the UN is functional, the Europeans are not obsessed with coralling American power and ideology is irrelevant.
There is much that is problematic with the neocons radical approach that had driven the Bush Admistration's foreign policy agenda: its impatience with details, its blanket reliance on unitilateral solutions and its ideological puritanism that have fueled out-of-control turf wars with the State/CIA realist establishment. But on the big issues - on the importance of democracy promotion and the impotence of current international institutions for global security, they are correct. Perhaps one day, the Dems will move beyond their worship of the Clinton years to develop a foreign policy agenda that will create real multilateral alternatives to the neocon's vision. Until then, the United States is better off with the semi-competent execution of the Bush Agenda than with a flawless execution of a neo-Clintonian alternative.
December 14, 2003
SADDAM IS CAUGHT
The Butcher of Baghdad is now in U.S. custody, and on the road to being tried for his crimes by the Iraqi people. Some quick thoughts on what this means for the year ahead.
In Iraq, this is a major blow to the Baathist part of the terrorist coalition fighting to prevent the U.S. from establishing a stable, democratic Iraq. We will now be primarily facing the foreign jihadis who had flooded the country and have declared it their primary front in the war on America. Without the post-Baathist infrastructure however, the jihadis will be increasingly isolated. While there is still much to do in Iraq, the capture of Saddam greatly improves the prospects for success
This of course is a disaster for the anti-war wing of the Democratic party, banking on quagmire in Iraq as the means to attack Bush in 2004. There is no adequate response to the blunt words of Joe Lieberman, that if the country followed the advice of Howard Dean and Co., Saddam would still be in power, rather than in prison. Despite this, I doubt that this will stem the gathering momentum of Dean. That the war in Iraq is a disaster is a matter of faith for the cultural left. They will wait for the first piece of bad news to renew their assault on Bush's policies, oblivious the lack of traction these charges are making outside of their own circle.
The Butcher of Baghdad is now in U.S. custody, and on the road to being tried for his crimes by the Iraqi people. Some quick thoughts on what this means for the year ahead.
In Iraq, this is a major blow to the Baathist part of the terrorist coalition fighting to prevent the U.S. from establishing a stable, democratic Iraq. We will now be primarily facing the foreign jihadis who had flooded the country and have declared it their primary front in the war on America. Without the post-Baathist infrastructure however, the jihadis will be increasingly isolated. While there is still much to do in Iraq, the capture of Saddam greatly improves the prospects for success
This of course is a disaster for the anti-war wing of the Democratic party, banking on quagmire in Iraq as the means to attack Bush in 2004. There is no adequate response to the blunt words of Joe Lieberman, that if the country followed the advice of Howard Dean and Co., Saddam would still be in power, rather than in prison. Despite this, I doubt that this will stem the gathering momentum of Dean. That the war in Iraq is a disaster is a matter of faith for the cultural left. They will wait for the first piece of bad news to renew their assault on Bush's policies, oblivious the lack of traction these charges are making outside of their own circle.
SADDAM IS CAUGHT
The Butcher of Baghdad is now in U.S. custody, and on the road to being tried for his crimes by the Iraqi people. Some quick thoughts on what this means for the year ahead.
In Iraq, this is a major blow to the Baathist part of the terrorist coalition fighting to prevent the U.S. from establishing a stable, democratic Iraq. We will now be primarily facing the foreign jihadis who had flooded the country and have declared it their primary front in the war on America. Without the post-Baathist infrastructure however, the jihadis will be increasingly isolated. While there is still much to do in Iraq, the capture of Saddam greatly improves the prospects for success
This of course is a disaster for the anti-war wing of the Democratic party, banking on quagmire in Iraq as the means to attack Bush in 2004. There is no adequate response to the blunt words of Joe Lieberman, that if the country followed the advice of Howard Dean and Co., Saddam would still be in power, rather than in prison. Despite this, I doubt that this will stem the gathering momentum of Dean. That the war in Iraq is a disaster is a matter of faith for the cultural left. They will wait for the first piece of bad news to renew their assault on Bush's policies, oblivious the lack of traction these charges are making outside of their own circle.
The Butcher of Baghdad is now in U.S. custody, and on the road to being tried for his crimes by the Iraqi people. Some quick thoughts on what this means for the year ahead.
In Iraq, this is a major blow to the Baathist part of the terrorist coalition fighting to prevent the U.S. from establishing a stable, democratic Iraq. We will now be primarily facing the foreign jihadis who had flooded the country and have declared it their primary front in the war on America. Without the post-Baathist infrastructure however, the jihadis will be increasingly isolated. While there is still much to do in Iraq, the capture of Saddam greatly improves the prospects for success
This of course is a disaster for the anti-war wing of the Democratic party, banking on quagmire in Iraq as the means to attack Bush in 2004. There is no adequate response to the blunt words of Joe Lieberman, that if the country followed the advice of Howard Dean and Co., Saddam would still be in power, rather than in prison. Despite this, I doubt that this will stem the gathering momentum of Dean. That the war in Iraq is a disaster is a matter of faith for the cultural left. They will wait for the first piece of bad news to renew their assault on Bush's policies, oblivious the lack of traction these charges are making outside of their own circle.
December 10, 2003
I CHOOSE JOE
I've been thinking long and hard about who to support for the Democratic nomination. I am squarely in the Anyone But Dean camp, for the central reason that his nomination is a validation of the knee-jerk left-wing opposition to the war in Iraq. Kerry voted against the first Gulf War, which while being the wrong position, was a coherent position - as opposed to his waffle on this war. I give Gephardt credit for showing the Dems a way to victory in 2004 (hawkish on terror, but uncompromising on the economic issues), but I his protectionism is simply too much for me. So that left Clark, Edwards and Lieberman.
Clark is probably the most electable candidate in the field. His resume will close the national security gap better than any other Dem could hope. Secondly, Clark's experience puts him a better position to craft an independent response on the critical challenges on the war on terror, rather than rely on the "wisdom" of the old Clinton team, which botched the issues when they were in office. And if Clark had demonstrated that independence so far, I'd be on board already - but he hasn't. Rather, Clark has pretty much spat out the same tired nostrums of multilateralism and realism that most of the other candidates have so far. Frankly, I'm uninspired. Despite that, Clark is still the candidate I'm most likely going to pull the lever for on March 2d, because he has the best chance of emerging as the ABD candidate.
John Edwards on the other hand, is inspiring, his poll number notwithstanding. He has not only developed the most creative and insightful domestic policy initiatives of any candidate, but has also honed the best message to challenge Bush. And with his charisma and personal skills, he has the ability to be a powerful messanger as well. Unfortunately, after 9/11, I can't afford to simply choose a candidate based on his domestic agenda and Edwards does not have a coherent foreign policy agenda. His political instincts led him to support the war, but I get no sense that he did it with any conviction. Nor does Edwards have anything original to say about what to do next in Iraq. I have no doubt that at least at first, an Edwards administration would simply be Clinton redux on the foreign agenda.
My heart has always been with Lieberman. Long before he was chosen to be vice-president, I believed his combination of religious conviction (allowing him to claim the cultural center without yielding ground on the rights of women and gays), agressive Wilsonian foreign agenda and pragmatic left-of-center socioeconomic positions were ideal for the party and the country.
I'd have committed long ago if I actually believe Joe had a shot to win this thing. Alas, he is too moderate in policies to win the nomination, and too moderate in temperment to win the election (he's
too much of a mensch to last 10 rounds with the Bushies, who play as dirty as the heavy in a pro wrestling match).
But as of now, anything short of a Dean nomination and a Bush victory is a longshot, so I might as well take place in the struggle for the soul of Democratic party. The reality is that the Dems simply do not understand the realities of a post 9/11 world. The left is hostile to American power, a toxic mix of Jeffersonian isolationism and globalist utopianism. The Clintonian center is in denial as to the failures of the Clinton years, refusing to understand the limits of multilateralism and realism, that the same policies that worked so well in the areas of trade would fail to contain Sadaam or create a viable, peaceful Palestinian state. Lieberman in contrast presents a muscular Wilsonian alternative - unyielding in its commitment to human rights and democracy, but pragmatic in its means. Lieberman rejects both the knee-jerk unilateralism of the neocons and Cheyney-Rumsfeld Jacksonians as well as the knee-jerk multilateralism of the Dem opposition. He is a lone voice of sanity in the foreign policy discourse of the Dems and the country as a whole.
So, as long as I'm picking the longshot - I might as well back my favorite. Go Joe, go.
I've been thinking long and hard about who to support for the Democratic nomination. I am squarely in the Anyone But Dean camp, for the central reason that his nomination is a validation of the knee-jerk left-wing opposition to the war in Iraq. Kerry voted against the first Gulf War, which while being the wrong position, was a coherent position - as opposed to his waffle on this war. I give Gephardt credit for showing the Dems a way to victory in 2004 (hawkish on terror, but uncompromising on the economic issues), but I his protectionism is simply too much for me. So that left Clark, Edwards and Lieberman.
Clark is probably the most electable candidate in the field. His resume will close the national security gap better than any other Dem could hope. Secondly, Clark's experience puts him a better position to craft an independent response on the critical challenges on the war on terror, rather than rely on the "wisdom" of the old Clinton team, which botched the issues when they were in office. And if Clark had demonstrated that independence so far, I'd be on board already - but he hasn't. Rather, Clark has pretty much spat out the same tired nostrums of multilateralism and realism that most of the other candidates have so far. Frankly, I'm uninspired. Despite that, Clark is still the candidate I'm most likely going to pull the lever for on March 2d, because he has the best chance of emerging as the ABD candidate.
John Edwards on the other hand, is inspiring, his poll number notwithstanding. He has not only developed the most creative and insightful domestic policy initiatives of any candidate, but has also honed the best message to challenge Bush. And with his charisma and personal skills, he has the ability to be a powerful messanger as well. Unfortunately, after 9/11, I can't afford to simply choose a candidate based on his domestic agenda and Edwards does not have a coherent foreign policy agenda. His political instincts led him to support the war, but I get no sense that he did it with any conviction. Nor does Edwards have anything original to say about what to do next in Iraq. I have no doubt that at least at first, an Edwards administration would simply be Clinton redux on the foreign agenda.
My heart has always been with Lieberman. Long before he was chosen to be vice-president, I believed his combination of religious conviction (allowing him to claim the cultural center without yielding ground on the rights of women and gays), agressive Wilsonian foreign agenda and pragmatic left-of-center socioeconomic positions were ideal for the party and the country.
I'd have committed long ago if I actually believe Joe had a shot to win this thing. Alas, he is too moderate in policies to win the nomination, and too moderate in temperment to win the election (he's
too much of a mensch to last 10 rounds with the Bushies, who play as dirty as the heavy in a pro wrestling match).
But as of now, anything short of a Dean nomination and a Bush victory is a longshot, so I might as well take place in the struggle for the soul of Democratic party. The reality is that the Dems simply do not understand the realities of a post 9/11 world. The left is hostile to American power, a toxic mix of Jeffersonian isolationism and globalist utopianism. The Clintonian center is in denial as to the failures of the Clinton years, refusing to understand the limits of multilateralism and realism, that the same policies that worked so well in the areas of trade would fail to contain Sadaam or create a viable, peaceful Palestinian state. Lieberman in contrast presents a muscular Wilsonian alternative - unyielding in its commitment to human rights and democracy, but pragmatic in its means. Lieberman rejects both the knee-jerk unilateralism of the neocons and Cheyney-Rumsfeld Jacksonians as well as the knee-jerk multilateralism of the Dem opposition. He is a lone voice of sanity in the foreign policy discourse of the Dems and the country as a whole.
So, as long as I'm picking the longshot - I might as well back my favorite. Go Joe, go.
December 04, 2003
ISLAM DOES NOT NEED A POPE
In a fascinating but thoroughly flawed essay, Edward Feser makes the argument that Islam, rather than needing a reformation, needs a Catholicization. There are three fundamental errors in Feser's argument. First, there is the Catholic revisionist claim that the Protestant Reformation far from being the central event towards the creation of liberal democracy in the West, was a step backwards from the perspective of reason and freedom. Second, that Islam is like Protestant Christianity – devoid of a legal tradition and therefore is prone to religious totalitarianism. Finally, that the cause of Islamic nations current lawlessness is Islamic heterodoxy, not orthodoxy.
The first mistake Feser makes is historical (or more likely polemical) – the limiting the consequence of the Reformation to simply the creation of Protestantism. The legacy of the Reformation goes far past that of Luther, Calvin or Henry VIII. The real fruits of the Reformation – religious toleration and separation of church and state – came later, as a result of the Dutch Revolt, the 30 years war and the English Civil War (and Glorious Revolution). So while the humanism of Michaelangelo’s Rome may compare favorably to Calvin’s Geneva, it pales in comparison to Spinoza’s Amsterdam or Locke’s London.
The second mistake is an ignorant portrayal of Islam. It is ironic that such an admirer of Aquinus does not recognize how much Aquinus's work parallels and builds upon the great medieval Islamic thinker, Ibn Rashid and Ibn Sina. Feser, however, is too committed to his patently false linkage of Islam as Protestantism, and lumping the two together in opposition to legalistic, rational Catholicism. While Islam lacks a centralized hierarchy, it very much has "an effective mechanism for an application of the principles of an ongoing Tradition to new circumstances." Sharia is no less a legal system than canon law than is Anglo-American common law less a legal system than code-based system. For centuries the system (at least as practised in the Sunni world) was extraordinarily effective at adapting to different cultural contexts without fracturing the unity of Islam. Feser's critique is somewhat more accurate for Shi’a Islam in that it invests more authority in individual leaders, and thus is prone to Protestant-like splintering in a way Sunni Islam is not, but Shi'a leaders must still justify their innovations as within the bounds of sharia.
The problem faced by Islam is not that there does not exists a mechanism to react to change, but that modernity posed such dramatic change that traditional tools of sharia could not address. Thus, it is a uniquely modern problem that Islam's center is unable to de-legitimize radical movements. This weakening of the traditional centers of Islamic jurisprudence has been combined with the political success of the radicals – who have in turn used alliances with authoritarian regimes to suppress and co-opt the traditional centers of Islamic learning and jurisprudence. Thus is it is not the lawlessness of Islam that led to the lawlessness in Islamic states, it is the lawlessness of Islamic states that has led to a lawlessness within Islam. One needs to look no further than strictures placed on women in Wahhabi Arabia and Taliban Afghanistan – which can not be justified under traditional sharia.
In some respects, the idea of an Islamic Pope, who can issue the equivalent of a Vatican II is appealing. In some ways, this is precisely what the Aga Khan has done for the Ismailis, greatly improving their condition. But this is not only unrealistic, it distracts from the core need for both Islam and the Islamic world – to separate state and religion. For Islam to truly adapt to the modern world – its various movements must be required to compete in the marketplace of ideas, and no longer rely on allied regimes to quash their theological rivals. What Islam needs is not a Pope, nor a Luther, but a Locke.
In a fascinating but thoroughly flawed essay, Edward Feser makes the argument that Islam, rather than needing a reformation, needs a Catholicization. There are three fundamental errors in Feser's argument. First, there is the Catholic revisionist claim that the Protestant Reformation far from being the central event towards the creation of liberal democracy in the West, was a step backwards from the perspective of reason and freedom. Second, that Islam is like Protestant Christianity – devoid of a legal tradition and therefore is prone to religious totalitarianism. Finally, that the cause of Islamic nations current lawlessness is Islamic heterodoxy, not orthodoxy.
The first mistake Feser makes is historical (or more likely polemical) – the limiting the consequence of the Reformation to simply the creation of Protestantism. The legacy of the Reformation goes far past that of Luther, Calvin or Henry VIII. The real fruits of the Reformation – religious toleration and separation of church and state – came later, as a result of the Dutch Revolt, the 30 years war and the English Civil War (and Glorious Revolution). So while the humanism of Michaelangelo’s Rome may compare favorably to Calvin’s Geneva, it pales in comparison to Spinoza’s Amsterdam or Locke’s London.
The second mistake is an ignorant portrayal of Islam. It is ironic that such an admirer of Aquinus does not recognize how much Aquinus's work parallels and builds upon the great medieval Islamic thinker, Ibn Rashid and Ibn Sina. Feser, however, is too committed to his patently false linkage of Islam as Protestantism, and lumping the two together in opposition to legalistic, rational Catholicism. While Islam lacks a centralized hierarchy, it very much has "an effective mechanism for an application of the principles of an ongoing Tradition to new circumstances." Sharia is no less a legal system than canon law than is Anglo-American common law less a legal system than code-based system. For centuries the system (at least as practised in the Sunni world) was extraordinarily effective at adapting to different cultural contexts without fracturing the unity of Islam. Feser's critique is somewhat more accurate for Shi’a Islam in that it invests more authority in individual leaders, and thus is prone to Protestant-like splintering in a way Sunni Islam is not, but Shi'a leaders must still justify their innovations as within the bounds of sharia.
The problem faced by Islam is not that there does not exists a mechanism to react to change, but that modernity posed such dramatic change that traditional tools of sharia could not address. Thus, it is a uniquely modern problem that Islam's center is unable to de-legitimize radical movements. This weakening of the traditional centers of Islamic jurisprudence has been combined with the political success of the radicals – who have in turn used alliances with authoritarian regimes to suppress and co-opt the traditional centers of Islamic learning and jurisprudence. Thus is it is not the lawlessness of Islam that led to the lawlessness in Islamic states, it is the lawlessness of Islamic states that has led to a lawlessness within Islam. One needs to look no further than strictures placed on women in Wahhabi Arabia and Taliban Afghanistan – which can not be justified under traditional sharia.
In some respects, the idea of an Islamic Pope, who can issue the equivalent of a Vatican II is appealing. In some ways, this is precisely what the Aga Khan has done for the Ismailis, greatly improving their condition. But this is not only unrealistic, it distracts from the core need for both Islam and the Islamic world – to separate state and religion. For Islam to truly adapt to the modern world – its various movements must be required to compete in the marketplace of ideas, and no longer rely on allied regimes to quash their theological rivals. What Islam needs is not a Pope, nor a Luther, but a Locke.
November 28, 2003
MY OWN PERSONAL PRIMARY:
Being a political junky, and demonstrating a masochistic side, I have been following the Democratic presidential primary closely for most of the past year. Yet, with Iowa and New Hampshire just weeks away I find myself unable to figure out which candidate to support for the nomination. Here are my brief thoughts about the frontrunner, Dean, and the pack that is chasing him.
HOWARD DEAN:
Domestic: Dean has a proven record on health care, has shown courage on civil unions, and has a commitment to fiscal conservatism that shows a willingness to buck the worst habits of certain left-leaning interest groups. While any of the candidates would be a major improvement over the disaster that is Bush's domestic policy, Dean in particular would do an excellent job on domestic issues.
Foreign: There are reasons to believe that Dean will not be a complete disaster in foreign policy. He supported the first Gulf War, he has not endorsed a Kucinichesque immediate pull-out from Iraq, Robert Kagan seems to think his idea are mainstream, but still there is no getting around the fact that Dean's candidacy is built upon his full-throated opposition to the Iraq war. Dean resonated with much of the grass-roots cultural left by sounding Jeffersonian themes of rejecting intervention as corrupting and immoral, and invoked the globalist elite's embrace of multilateralism for multilateralism's sake. While Dean has consistently been more radical in his tone than in his proposed policies, these instincts remain - as noted by his pandering statement that the U.S. should act "even-handed" between Israel and the Palestinians despite the latter's embrace of rejectionism and terror. To pull the lever for Dean for me would be to vote for a candidate I believe would do a worse job than Bush in protecting America's short-term and long-term national security.
Nomination Chances: He's the front-runner, having converted grass-roots support among culturally liberal professionals into Union endorsements. However, he will face a challenge when the party's establishment settles on an alternative candidate.
Electibility: No other candidate will mobilize the Democratic base to the extent Dean will - and if the paradigm has shifted as radically in favor of turnout (as opposed to swing appeal) as certain analysts believe, he has a fighting chance. Dean also has the tenacity to fight back against GOP mudslinging, and will not cede the framing of his character and issues without a fight. In truth, however, Dean is the dream candidate for the GOP. He is the easiest candidate for Bush to square off against for the culturally right-of-center working class voter, as Bush can paint Dean as soft on terror, play the homophobic card (alas) and send the party into four more years of political exile.
Being a political junky, and demonstrating a masochistic side, I have been following the Democratic presidential primary closely for most of the past year. Yet, with Iowa and New Hampshire just weeks away I find myself unable to figure out which candidate to support for the nomination. Here are my brief thoughts about the frontrunner, Dean, and the pack that is chasing him.
HOWARD DEAN:
Domestic: Dean has a proven record on health care, has shown courage on civil unions, and has a commitment to fiscal conservatism that shows a willingness to buck the worst habits of certain left-leaning interest groups. While any of the candidates would be a major improvement over the disaster that is Bush's domestic policy, Dean in particular would do an excellent job on domestic issues.
Foreign: There are reasons to believe that Dean will not be a complete disaster in foreign policy. He supported the first Gulf War, he has not endorsed a Kucinichesque immediate pull-out from Iraq, Robert Kagan seems to think his idea are mainstream, but still there is no getting around the fact that Dean's candidacy is built upon his full-throated opposition to the Iraq war. Dean resonated with much of the grass-roots cultural left by sounding Jeffersonian themes of rejecting intervention as corrupting and immoral, and invoked the globalist elite's embrace of multilateralism for multilateralism's sake. While Dean has consistently been more radical in his tone than in his proposed policies, these instincts remain - as noted by his pandering statement that the U.S. should act "even-handed" between Israel and the Palestinians despite the latter's embrace of rejectionism and terror. To pull the lever for Dean for me would be to vote for a candidate I believe would do a worse job than Bush in protecting America's short-term and long-term national security.
Nomination Chances: He's the front-runner, having converted grass-roots support among culturally liberal professionals into Union endorsements. However, he will face a challenge when the party's establishment settles on an alternative candidate.
Electibility: No other candidate will mobilize the Democratic base to the extent Dean will - and if the paradigm has shifted as radically in favor of turnout (as opposed to swing appeal) as certain analysts believe, he has a fighting chance. Dean also has the tenacity to fight back against GOP mudslinging, and will not cede the framing of his character and issues without a fight. In truth, however, Dean is the dream candidate for the GOP. He is the easiest candidate for Bush to square off against for the culturally right-of-center working class voter, as Bush can paint Dean as soft on terror, play the homophobic card (alas) and send the party into four more years of political exile.
November 05, 2003
"I CAN'T BELIEVE ITS NOT A FOREIGN POLICY" ISN'T GOING TO CUT IT
The uptick in the U.S. economy, coming in spite of the Bushies disastrous fiscal policy, has blunted the edge of the Dems domestic attacks against Bush, and as a result makes the need to close the national security gap between the president and the Dems all the more important.
Unfortunately, over 2 years after 9/11, and over 1 year from the debacle of the 2002 elections, the Democrats have failed to seriously address the problem. The party is still dominated by three camps. First, there are the Jeffersonian isolationists (dominant among the grassroots partisans of the cultural left) who view the whole Iraq project through the lens of oil and Vietnam. Second, there are the globalists (dominant among the party's foreign policy elite) who view the success of U.S. foreign policy through the lens of world opinions. Finally, and most strongly, there are the agnostic partisans (dominant among the party leadership) who continue to see foreign policy as a distraction from domestic issues and view Iraq solely through the lens of its impact on Bush's reelection.
The result has been for the Democrats to treat foreign policy and national security issues primarily as a political problem to be managed. Thus, while the true believers of the cultural left have latched on Dean, the party elite, rather than attempting to formulate a coherent foreign policy alternative to Bush, has sought out a candidate - first Kerry, and now Clark - that through their personal biography appears to present a foreign policy alternative. Both, however have been plagued by positions on Iraq that are consistent only in their criticism of Bush.
At the end of the day, the mirage of a foreign policy agenda will not substitute for the real thing....
The uptick in the U.S. economy, coming in spite of the Bushies disastrous fiscal policy, has blunted the edge of the Dems domestic attacks against Bush, and as a result makes the need to close the national security gap between the president and the Dems all the more important.
Unfortunately, over 2 years after 9/11, and over 1 year from the debacle of the 2002 elections, the Democrats have failed to seriously address the problem. The party is still dominated by three camps. First, there are the Jeffersonian isolationists (dominant among the grassroots partisans of the cultural left) who view the whole Iraq project through the lens of oil and Vietnam. Second, there are the globalists (dominant among the party's foreign policy elite) who view the success of U.S. foreign policy through the lens of world opinions. Finally, and most strongly, there are the agnostic partisans (dominant among the party leadership) who continue to see foreign policy as a distraction from domestic issues and view Iraq solely through the lens of its impact on Bush's reelection.
The result has been for the Democrats to treat foreign policy and national security issues primarily as a political problem to be managed. Thus, while the true believers of the cultural left have latched on Dean, the party elite, rather than attempting to formulate a coherent foreign policy alternative to Bush, has sought out a candidate - first Kerry, and now Clark - that through their personal biography appears to present a foreign policy alternative. Both, however have been plagued by positions on Iraq that are consistent only in their criticism of Bush.
At the end of the day, the mirage of a foreign policy agenda will not substitute for the real thing....
October 27, 2003
THE GLOVES ARE OFF
I am no longer barred from "engaging in partisan politics," which means that I can go back to pontificating on just about any subject I please....the Dems continuing failure to have a clue on foreign policy, the Bushies relentless anti-Robin Hooding, taking from programs for the poor and middle class to give to the rich, which Dem has the best chance in 2004....too many choices, indeed.
I am no longer barred from "engaging in partisan politics," which means that I can go back to pontificating on just about any subject I please....the Dems continuing failure to have a clue on foreign policy, the Bushies relentless anti-Robin Hooding, taking from programs for the poor and middle class to give to the rich, which Dem has the best chance in 2004....too many choices, indeed.
OTP SPORTS: 2003-04 NBA PREVIEW
Will Larry Brown be able to handle having players that can actually shoot? Will Allen Iverson be able to handle not having Larry Brown, but having a teammate who can actually shoot (and wants to in the clutch)? Can Jeff Van Gundy teach the Rocket guards how to pass? Will the post-Stockton-to-Malone Jazz break 80 points a game? Will LeBron match Tracy McGrady’s rookie numbers and still be called a disappointment? Will anyone pay attention to something other than the Kobe trial before the playoffs? Will Shaw run out of nicknames beginning with the Big? All this and more coming soon to a court near you....
THE FAVORITES: Will win the championship if....
(1) Lakers: ....Kobe is free & Shaq is healthy. Shaq rules the paint, Shaq rules the paint. But the Spurs won the West, the Spurs won the West. Shaq came back in shape, Shaq came back in shape... Any prediction that short of the obvious two pitfalls the Lakers will fail is wishful thinking.
WESTERN CONTENDERS: Will take advantage of a Lakers disaster if....
(2) Spurs: ....at least 2 of their 3 perimeter Euro-stars raise their games to the next level & Rasho fills Robinson’s void at least on offense. Hedo Turkoglu manages to accomplish something that successive Turkish governments have failed at for years, getting Turkey considered part of Europe.
(3) Kings: ....Miller, Divac, Webber, Stojokovic, Christie, Bibby and Jackson are healthy throughout their playoff run. There’s no reason in particular why the 20 games a year they are at full strength can’t be during the playoffs.
(4) Timberwolves: ....Spreewell is still a shut-down perimeter defender & Garnett rubs off on the Kandi Man. Whether or not this T-Wolves team threatens the top contenders over the next couple of years is really a question of what happens quicker - Olowokandi’s development or the veteran backcourt’s decline.
(5) Mavericks: ....Fortson & Bradley become a dominant rebounding/shot-blocking combination OR the NBA starts scoring by fantasy points. Combined shots per game last season of the Mavericks projected starting five: 88. Combined shots per game last season of entire Mavericks team: 85. Take away some hair, add some pot - and you’ve got the TrailBlazers of a couple of years ago - with similar disappointing results.
WESTERN PACK: Will make the playoffs if:
(6) Suns: ....Stoudemire does not regress from his break-out rookie season OR they get descent center play out of their latest Euro experiment at center. As long as Marbury continues his new-found romance with passing, they will be an entertaining donut team - which is what the Suns are supposed to be - right?
(7) Trailblazers: ....figure out how to get Randolph and Wallace on the court together as much as possible & either Stoudamire or McInnis remembers how they used to play point guard. Everybody loves to talk about how the Blazers collapsed when their chemistry went south, but the reality of the matter is that the Blazers ceased being contenders when Sabonis, who was a dominant talent even past-his-prime, lost one more critical step. Another season of an abudance of talent at 2-through-4 wasted by ineffective play at center and the point.
(8) Rockets: ....run the offense through the very tall, sweet-shooting, agile Chinese man rather than gunning up 3s & Get steady play at forward. The odds are that Jim Jackson will provide steady play at small forward, supplemented by defensive specialist Adrian Griffin. The mess is power forward, where their potential third star, Eddie Griffin, will be spending at least the beginning of the season working out “personal issues." Left with the fragile and board-phobic Maurice Taylor as a running mate, Yao may have to wait one more year before camping out in the postseason.
(9) Supersonics: ....Radmanovic has a breakout season & Jerome James does as well. Led by Ray Allen’s Everlasting Gobstopper of a shot, the Sonics perimeter players are good enough to get them into the playoffs. However, they better not miss, because its anyone’s guess as to who in the Sonics mediocre frontcourt will consistently get a rebound or slow down one of the conference’s super-dreadnoughts.
(10) Grizzlies: ....the Wright-Tsalkidas-Swift combo forms an effective center rotation & Mike Miller matches his hype. I don’t envy Hubie Brown the task of figuring out how to divide 96 minutes a game between Miller, Shane Battier, James Posey, Wesley Person, Troy Bell, Dahntay Jones and Michael Dickerson (the poor man’s Grant Hill). On the other hand, I’m not the Logo, so I’ll just shut up now.
WESTERN LONGSHOTS: Will be watchable if...
(11) Warriors: ....Dunleavy develops OR Van Exel plays instead of pouts. Between Murphy’s shot and Richardson’s quicks, a motivated Van Exel is good enough to keep them competitive. But the odds are that the team does not recover from losing its two big guns from last year, and that their new point guard will be screaming for a trade by the end of the calender year.
(12) Nuggets: ....Anthony is ready to score 18-20 a game right away & Marcus Camby is healthy for 2/3 of the season. No matter what, the Nuggets will be more watchable than last year’s plucky bunch which excelled at ugly ball. And heck if Camby is actual healthy for most of the season, and Andre Miller regains his mojo, they would be competitive for a playoff spot - in the East.
(13) Clippers: .....Quentin Richardson rediscovers his shot & either Jaric or Dooling develop ahead of schedule. Forget about the “success” of the Clippers off-season. Elton Brand is still a top 5-power forward, but the supporting cast around him is erratic at best. Positive thinking can’t bring the ball up the court and create open shots.
(14) Jazz: ....you watch old footage of Stockton-to-Malone OR Keon Clark suddenly turns into a young Shawn Kemp. Despite the gritty, fundamentally solid play of Harping, and the potential of Kirlenko, it is going to be a long, long season in Utah.
LEASTERN PRETENDERS: Will lose in the Finals if....
(1) Nets: ....‘Zo is 75% of the old ‘Zo & K-Mart shakes off last years Finals. The Nets should move to Brooklyn. In one fell swoop, the franchise would regain its street cred and New Yorkers wouldn’t have to feel guilty about abandoning the woeful Knicks to watch entertaining basketball. That being said, if the Mourning gamble works as well as the Mutumbo gamble did last year, the continued development of Jefferson and Martin will not hold off the Pistons or Pacers, let alone steal them a game or two in the Finals against what will undoubtedly be a tougher Western foe this year.
(2) Pistons: ....Larry Brown decides making 3-point shots is consistent with “playing the game the right way” & the young perimeter players buy into the system. We all know how talented Brown is at getting the most out of hard-working, smart, second-tier players (see Snow & McKie), and that he can also to a lesser extent improve the game of passionate, undisciplined superstars (see Iverson). But what we haven’t seen is Brown maximizing the talents of softer, skilled players who are less adept on defense (see Tim Thomas, Kukoc, Van Horn). Can Brown adapt his plan to the talents of Billups, Hamilton and Okur? If not, they won’t ever take the next step.
(3) Pacers: ....Pollard & Foster make up for the loss of Miller’s toughness, and Carlisle molds the talented swingmen into a consistent supporting cast. At what point do Al Harrington and Jonathan Bender go from being not-yets to nevers? Well, it’s only fair to see how they do with decent coaching. Isaiah - great point guard, great prophet, as a coach, not-so-hot.
EASTERN PACK: Will make the playoffs if....
(4) Magic: ....McGrady’s back holds up. This is no longer a one-man band. It what seems to be a running theme this season, the top two players in the supporting cast play at the same position, but if they figure out how to use Howard and Gooden at the same time, they get to the second round this time.
(5) Sixers: ....The frontline holds up. Its time to let go of the idea of the Sixers as a defensive team. In the past three years, they’ve replaced a front court of Mutumbo, Hill, Lynch, and Geiger with Coleman, Thomas, Robinson and Jackson, in each case gaining offense and losing defense. The Sixers have to rely on their backcourt for defensive pressure, which is why their playoff runs the past couple of seasons skid to a halt whenever Snow and/or McKie lose a step with an injury.
(6) Hornets: ....Tim Floyd is not as inept as his Chicago record. A healthy Hornets squad can compete within anyone in the East. It is also an oxymoron. Two years ago it was Mashburn, last year Davis. The bench, with the acquisition of Darrel Armstrong notwithstanding, it paper-thin and will again keep this team mired in the Eastern pack.
(7) Bulls: ....Curry and Chandler keep developing & Rose doesn’t have a meltdown. The Bulls look to be two years away from challenging for the East, but with the best young bigs in the conference will get half way there this year, and perhaps farther if Pippen is healthy for the playoff run.
(8) Raptors:...Vince is healthy & Moiso or Bosh develops into a shotblocking force. The odds are that by midseason, the “what happened to Vince Carter” talk will be replaced by “when did Antonio Davis get that old” talk.
(9) Celtics:...Raef Lafrentz looks for his shot & Vin Baker’s comeback is real. The Celtics physically have one of the strongest frontcourts in the conference in Battie, LaFrentz and Baker. Mentally is another story, and the odds of both of their talented underachieving big men finally achieving is a long shot.
(10) Wizards:...A big (Brown or Haywood) & a swingman (Hayes, Hughes, or Jeffries) develops this season. Arenas will earn his paycheck, and so will Stackhouse if his injury isn’t too severe. The key will be whether or how the collection of lottery picks pans out. The sweet shooting Hayes will most likely force his way into the rotation and be part of the solution. Whether the light-bulb goes off inside Kwame Brown is a whole nother story.
(11) Knicks....McDyess is healthy and 90% of the player he used to be OR Mutumbo can give them 20 minutes a night of vintage Deke dominance. Neither of these rosy scenarios seems likely. Fortunately for the rest of the league, the Knicks quick-fix approach, nor their status of least bang-for-the-buck professional sports franchise, doesn’t seem to be ending any time soon.
EASTERN LONGSHOTS: Will be watchable if...
(12) Cavaliers: ....LeBron is on the court. Enough LeBron. If Ilgauskas stays healthy, this team has an outside shot at a playoff spot. But when the big Z is out of the game, the Cavs collection of blacktop all-stars (Miles, Wagner, Davis) will give Paul Silas nightly headdaches.
(13) Heat: ....they spend the entire game on a fast break. Who doesn’t like swingmen - with their athlteticism and versatility, they are much more enjoyable to watch then the lumbering giants or point guards that dunk once a season, but Miami’s plan to put 4 on the court (with a power forward, mind you not even a real center) at the same time isn’t going to get them very far. The good news is that some team that needs a guy who can score might be able to trade a lumbering big-man for Eddie Jones or Dwayne Wade in the middle of the year.
(14) Bucks: ....If they find a legitimate starting power forward or center. Between Redd, Mason and Thomas they’ll score, but they will easily be the worst defensive team in the league this season. Write it down - the Mavericks will break 150 points against this team.
(15) Hawks:...If they have the Theo Ratliff of 3 years ago in the paint the whole year. By the middle of February, Stephen Jackson will be shooting somewhere around 40%, half the frontcourt will be on the IL, and Terry and Abdur-Rahim will be routinely combining for more than 50 points in blowout losses.
WESTERN CONFERNECE FINALS: Lakers over Spurs
EASTERN CONFERENCE FINALS: Nets over Pistons
FINALS: Lakers over Nets
October 16, 2003
WORLD ISLAMIC CONFERENCE USES THE PROTOCOLS FOR TALKING POINTS
With the crippling poverty, rampant illiteracy, and growing strength of the death-cult wing of the faith, you would think that the leaders of the Islamic nations of the world would have serious issues to focus on at the Organization of Islamic States summit in Malaysia. However, Malaysian prime minister Mahatir Mohammad decided to focus on the "real" cause of problems in the Islamic world - the Jews. Mohammad described the Jewish threat as follows:
Such anti-Semtic trope would be bad enough coming from one of the usual suspects - a rejectionist Arab tyrant like Ghaddaffi, or an Iranian mullahs - but these words come from instead the leader of prosperous, relatively moderate Malaysia. When the voices of Islamic moderation are steeped in full-blooded Jew-hatred, it shows that while the battle for the soul of Islam is far from over, it is currently being lost - badly.
With the crippling poverty, rampant illiteracy, and growing strength of the death-cult wing of the faith, you would think that the leaders of the Islamic nations of the world would have serious issues to focus on at the Organization of Islamic States summit in Malaysia. However, Malaysian prime minister Mahatir Mohammad decided to focus on the "real" cause of problems in the Islamic world - the Jews. Mohammad described the Jewish threat as follows:
They succeeded in gaining control in most of the [world's] powerful states, and they – a tiny community – became a world power. But 1.3 billion Muslims must not be defeated by a few million Jews. A way must be found."
"The Europeans killed six million Jews out of 12 million, but today the Jews are in control of the world via their proxies. They lead others to fight and die for them."
Such anti-Semtic trope would be bad enough coming from one of the usual suspects - a rejectionist Arab tyrant like Ghaddaffi, or an Iranian mullahs - but these words come from instead the leader of prosperous, relatively moderate Malaysia. When the voices of Islamic moderation are steeped in full-blooded Jew-hatred, it shows that while the battle for the soul of Islam is far from over, it is currently being lost - badly.
October 15, 2003
OSLO-ITIS: WHEN WILL THEY EVER LEARN?
If you want to encapsulate the utter failure of the Israeli Left to learn anything from the disaster of Oslo in one quote, this statement reported in Ha'aretz would be it.
The myopia of the Israeli Left is staggering. How exactly, is a Palestinian "dictatorship like Egypt" supposed to provide peace, when its can only remain in power by displacing the public's frustration with internal tyranny onto an external villain? But the Israeli Left's love of the Arab strongman - which caused it to overlook Oslo's fatal flaw - is still intact despite the misery it caused both Israelis and Palestinians in the past decade. And until they shake it, they are just as dangerous to the long-term hopes of peace as the most radical settler in his hilltop trailer.
If you want to encapsulate the utter failure of the Israeli Left to learn anything from the disaster of Oslo in one quote, this statement reported in Ha'aretz would be it.
As one official involved in the agreements put it, "As far as I'm concerned, it can be a dictatorship like it is
in Egypt, but if they can't provide security, there will be no accord."
The myopia of the Israeli Left is staggering. How exactly, is a Palestinian "dictatorship like Egypt" supposed to provide peace, when its can only remain in power by displacing the public's frustration with internal tyranny onto an external villain? But the Israeli Left's love of the Arab strongman - which caused it to overlook Oslo's fatal flaw - is still intact despite the misery it caused both Israelis and Palestinians in the past decade. And until they shake it, they are just as dangerous to the long-term hopes of peace as the most radical settler in his hilltop trailer.
October 13, 2003
PERMANENT OSLO-ITIS
There is plenty of irrationality to spare in the Israel-Palestinian conflict, yet it is one more twist of irony that the most rational actors, such as Arafat and the settlers are deemed "irrational," while the die-hard Peace Processors are considered the beacon of rationality. Arafat's actions may be fully contradictory to the hope of a negotiated "two-state" solution, but they have been quite consistent with his core goals - of staying as the dominant Palestinian power broker, and keeping the conflict sufficiently roiling until the Israelis make unilateral concessions or trigger an international intervention by over-reacting. Similarly, for those like MK Benny Elon and the settlers he represents that advocate a Bantustan or "voluntary" transfer "solution" - the continued expansion of settlements deep within the West Bank and Gaza is a fully rational means towards such ends.
For truly astonishing irrational behavior, however, there is the Israeli Left - led by the patron saint of Oslo, Dr. Yossi Beilin. The latest gambit of Beilin, Avraham Burg and others has been to negotiate a proposed settlement with the Palestinians in which Israeli sovereignty over the Temple Mount would be exchanged in return for a Palestinian concession of their insistence that all the descendants of the 1948 refugees (and anyone else the Palestinians wish to count as a "refugee") be settled within pre-1967 Israel.
The faith of the Israeli Left in the power of Israeli concessions to Fatah-led Palestinians is unshakable. While it rational to support a hypothesis in the absence of any evidence, it is fundamentally irrational to do so after an experiment has clearly disproved the theory. Yet, the Peace Processors press on, as if the Oslo experiment was never performed. This insanity is magnified in light of yet another resignation of a would-be Palestinian PM. Putting aside the unwillingness of Fatah to accept the existence of Israel as a Jewish State and abide by any agreements it makes with Israel, Fatah can not even reach an internal consensus on the desirability of creating a functioning Palestinian government, much less create one by eliminating by eliminating the militias.
The Israeli Left however steadfastly refuses to treat the internal politics of the Palestinians as anything more than a black box. To do so would require them to admit the disastrous decision that led to the Oslo Debacle - the decision to rehabilitate Arafat and Fatah rather than strengthen local leaders, the decision to prioritize the process over Palestinian compliance, and most importantly the decision to rely upon Arafat to impose "Peace" from the top down, rather than developing Palestinian political and economic institutions that would provide the environment where grass-roots support for peace could emerge.
The Road Map might have been too little, too late with regard to the failings of Oslo - but at least it addressed the core problems. The Peace Processors, however, are intent to keep putting their finger back in socket - again and again and again. While the Palestinians are stuck with the rational architect of their misery, the Israelis were vote the irrational architects of their misery out of power.
There is plenty of irrationality to spare in the Israel-Palestinian conflict, yet it is one more twist of irony that the most rational actors, such as Arafat and the settlers are deemed "irrational," while the die-hard Peace Processors are considered the beacon of rationality. Arafat's actions may be fully contradictory to the hope of a negotiated "two-state" solution, but they have been quite consistent with his core goals - of staying as the dominant Palestinian power broker, and keeping the conflict sufficiently roiling until the Israelis make unilateral concessions or trigger an international intervention by over-reacting. Similarly, for those like MK Benny Elon and the settlers he represents that advocate a Bantustan or "voluntary" transfer "solution" - the continued expansion of settlements deep within the West Bank and Gaza is a fully rational means towards such ends.
For truly astonishing irrational behavior, however, there is the Israeli Left - led by the patron saint of Oslo, Dr. Yossi Beilin. The latest gambit of Beilin, Avraham Burg and others has been to negotiate a proposed settlement with the Palestinians in which Israeli sovereignty over the Temple Mount would be exchanged in return for a Palestinian concession of their insistence that all the descendants of the 1948 refugees (and anyone else the Palestinians wish to count as a "refugee") be settled within pre-1967 Israel.
The faith of the Israeli Left in the power of Israeli concessions to Fatah-led Palestinians is unshakable. While it rational to support a hypothesis in the absence of any evidence, it is fundamentally irrational to do so after an experiment has clearly disproved the theory. Yet, the Peace Processors press on, as if the Oslo experiment was never performed. This insanity is magnified in light of yet another resignation of a would-be Palestinian PM. Putting aside the unwillingness of Fatah to accept the existence of Israel as a Jewish State and abide by any agreements it makes with Israel, Fatah can not even reach an internal consensus on the desirability of creating a functioning Palestinian government, much less create one by eliminating by eliminating the militias.
The Israeli Left however steadfastly refuses to treat the internal politics of the Palestinians as anything more than a black box. To do so would require them to admit the disastrous decision that led to the Oslo Debacle - the decision to rehabilitate Arafat and Fatah rather than strengthen local leaders, the decision to prioritize the process over Palestinian compliance, and most importantly the decision to rely upon Arafat to impose "Peace" from the top down, rather than developing Palestinian political and economic institutions that would provide the environment where grass-roots support for peace could emerge.
The Road Map might have been too little, too late with regard to the failings of Oslo - but at least it addressed the core problems. The Peace Processors, however, are intent to keep putting their finger back in socket - again and again and again. While the Palestinians are stuck with the rational architect of their misery, the Israelis were vote the irrational architects of their misery out of power.
September 30, 2003
ALL OR NOTHING ON THE FENCE
So Sharon has finally made up his mind - Ariel (and the far less publicized, but far more problematic Kedumim) are going to be on the Israeli side of the fence. This decision pretty much destroys the remaining shred of credibility to the fiction that the fence route is not the preliminary determination of Israel's permanent borders with a Palestinian (or Palestinian-Jordanian) state. Ariel, the largest settlement outside of the Jeruasalem suburbs was slated to remain part of Israel under any of the realistic final status proposals. To require Israel to cede it at this point would be a perverse reward for Palestinian terror and rejectionism. That, however, was precisely what the State Department, with its plan to link the loan guarentees to the route of the fence was seeking.
Its not the State Department's stated goal in wielding the fiscal threat - preventing the fence from carving out boundaries that prevent a contiguous, viable Palestinian entity - that's the problem. It is the blatant falsehood that any annexation of the West Bank is tantamount to such a result. It is the delusion that all settlements are equal - that Ariel is somehow the same as the hilltop settlements that lie on the roads betwen Nablus and Ramallah, or in the heart of Hebron. And so with their fetishization of the Green Line, the Peace Processors of Foggy Bottom fall into the same All or Nothing mentality of the most radical settlers.
There will be no negotiated solution any time in the near future. The best anyone who hopes for a long-term peace can do is to support a unilateral seperation that makes the most sense. If the Peace Processors feel a need to pressure Israel, they should apply pressure for the dismantling of Netzarim and Elon Moreh.
On a positive note, the Sharon government has altered the route of the fence near Jerusalem so as not to bisect Al Quds university. The decision to correct the bone-headed decision came as a result of pressure applied by non-violent protests by Al Quds students and faculty. Non-violent protest by Palestinians...a truly novel idea.
So Sharon has finally made up his mind - Ariel (and the far less publicized, but far more problematic Kedumim) are going to be on the Israeli side of the fence. This decision pretty much destroys the remaining shred of credibility to the fiction that the fence route is not the preliminary determination of Israel's permanent borders with a Palestinian (or Palestinian-Jordanian) state. Ariel, the largest settlement outside of the Jeruasalem suburbs was slated to remain part of Israel under any of the realistic final status proposals. To require Israel to cede it at this point would be a perverse reward for Palestinian terror and rejectionism. That, however, was precisely what the State Department, with its plan to link the loan guarentees to the route of the fence was seeking.
Its not the State Department's stated goal in wielding the fiscal threat - preventing the fence from carving out boundaries that prevent a contiguous, viable Palestinian entity - that's the problem. It is the blatant falsehood that any annexation of the West Bank is tantamount to such a result. It is the delusion that all settlements are equal - that Ariel is somehow the same as the hilltop settlements that lie on the roads betwen Nablus and Ramallah, or in the heart of Hebron. And so with their fetishization of the Green Line, the Peace Processors of Foggy Bottom fall into the same All or Nothing mentality of the most radical settlers.
There will be no negotiated solution any time in the near future. The best anyone who hopes for a long-term peace can do is to support a unilateral seperation that makes the most sense. If the Peace Processors feel a need to pressure Israel, they should apply pressure for the dismantling of Netzarim and Elon Moreh.
On a positive note, the Sharon government has altered the route of the fence near Jerusalem so as not to bisect Al Quds university. The decision to correct the bone-headed decision came as a result of pressure applied by non-violent protests by Al Quds students and faculty. Non-violent protest by Palestinians...a truly novel idea.
September 18, 2003
WE HAVE NOTHING TO CONFESS
Stephen Waldman, in an effort to "alienate both his Jewish and Christian relatives" offers up moral equivalence on the incendiary issue of the Passion Play - brought once more into public debate by the upcoming medeival cinematic version by Mel Gibson. Jews, Waldman asserts, should admit that "some of [our] forefathers probably helped get Jesus killed," but Christians should admit that the Gospels were probably a biased version of the facts, and that Christian reprisals against the Jews were antithetical to Christian theology. So, you see, there's a perfectly reasonable solution to the problem - we can all agree that we've both been wrong, agree to call it a day, and go on to intermarry away our divisions.
The problem of course is that there's simply no equating the so-called "wrongs" on both sides in this case. To put it in stark contemporary terms, it is the equivalent of stating that Jews should admit that that some of their leaders helped cause Germany's defeat in World War I, but that Germans should admit that the Holocaust was an overreaction.
Waldman evinces an awareness of the polemic nature of the Gospels, admitting that "there is a strong possibility that" they "distorted the history of the 'Jewish' role" in Jesus's death. Yet his argument for his claim for "as best as we can tell, Jews did kill Jesus" rests solely on the Gospel. There is a bit of an absurdity in setting up the New Testament as the accepted basis for Jewish-Christian dialogue. After all, there is no getting past the fact that the Gospels are Truth for Christians and rejected heresy for Jews. Therefore, the fact that Bible scholars consider Mark to be the most authentic of the Gospels, and it contains the charge as well, is irrelevant. It can no more establish Jewish culpability in the death of Jesus than the first version of the Protocals could establish Jewish control of world capital. (Of course, unlike the Protocals, the Gospels contain the truths of Jesus's ethical teachings, while the Protocals are wholesale and sinsiter fabrications).
So rather than turning to proof texts that one side reveres as revelation and the other side rejects as polemics, it would be better to look to the other information we have about Roman Judea during the life of Jesus. The cite from Josephus (who is the most reliable historian of the period only because he is the only historian of the period) therefore is the strongest support for anything like the Gospel account. However, any argument in support of Jewish culpability must address a number of countervailing facts. First, that the Jewish religious authorities had autonomy to execute heretics (by stoning, not crucification). Second, within all the strains of Second Temple Judaism, the Messiah was seen as a temporal, political savior, not the Christian understanding of a spiritual purifier, and therefore a threat first and foremost to the temporal power of Rome. More than one would-be Messiah was crucified by Rome during the period of Jesus's death.
Finally, to the extent that any possible colloboration between Jews and Romans existed, it would clearly not have involved the forebearers of rabbinic Judasim, the Pharisees. Jerusalem was dominated by the temple-centered Saducees. The Pharisees base of power was centered in the outlying parts of Judea, especially in the Galilee. It is well-documented that the Saducees more than any other sect were the most collusive with the Roman authorities. The Pharisees, on the other hand, clashed with the colonial power, leading their eventual entanglement in the doomed revolts - and the development of pacific ethos by their rabbinnic followers. Thus the chances that any of "our forebearers" involvement are truly slim.
It is one thing to in an academic discussion of the death of Jesus, come to the conclusion intra-Jewish infighting might have played a role. It is something else to require of the Jews, who have sufferred immeassureably from the slander of deicide for over 2000 years to admit to anything. (Nor does Waldman's Jewish ancestry give him leave to do so on the Jews behalf). Jews have every right to "be defensive" about the theological linchpin of Christian anti-semetism. Alas, there is only one party required to look inward on this issue - and that is Christianity. The beauty of that faith, seen everyday in the lives of those who, inspired by Jesus's example, pursue justice and seek holiness, is stained by the slander of the deicide against the Jews and its bloody consequences. No the Jews did not kill Jesus, and until Christianity commits to this truth, a religion that through Jesus shows a path to G-d will keep leading some of its members hopeless astray.
Stephen Waldman, in an effort to "alienate both his Jewish and Christian relatives" offers up moral equivalence on the incendiary issue of the Passion Play - brought once more into public debate by the upcoming medeival cinematic version by Mel Gibson. Jews, Waldman asserts, should admit that "some of [our] forefathers probably helped get Jesus killed," but Christians should admit that the Gospels were probably a biased version of the facts, and that Christian reprisals against the Jews were antithetical to Christian theology. So, you see, there's a perfectly reasonable solution to the problem - we can all agree that we've both been wrong, agree to call it a day, and go on to intermarry away our divisions.
The problem of course is that there's simply no equating the so-called "wrongs" on both sides in this case. To put it in stark contemporary terms, it is the equivalent of stating that Jews should admit that that some of their leaders helped cause Germany's defeat in World War I, but that Germans should admit that the Holocaust was an overreaction.
Waldman evinces an awareness of the polemic nature of the Gospels, admitting that "there is a strong possibility that" they "distorted the history of the 'Jewish' role" in Jesus's death. Yet his argument for his claim for "as best as we can tell, Jews did kill Jesus" rests solely on the Gospel. There is a bit of an absurdity in setting up the New Testament as the accepted basis for Jewish-Christian dialogue. After all, there is no getting past the fact that the Gospels are Truth for Christians and rejected heresy for Jews. Therefore, the fact that Bible scholars consider Mark to be the most authentic of the Gospels, and it contains the charge as well, is irrelevant. It can no more establish Jewish culpability in the death of Jesus than the first version of the Protocals could establish Jewish control of world capital. (Of course, unlike the Protocals, the Gospels contain the truths of Jesus's ethical teachings, while the Protocals are wholesale and sinsiter fabrications).
So rather than turning to proof texts that one side reveres as revelation and the other side rejects as polemics, it would be better to look to the other information we have about Roman Judea during the life of Jesus. The cite from Josephus (who is the most reliable historian of the period only because he is the only historian of the period) therefore is the strongest support for anything like the Gospel account. However, any argument in support of Jewish culpability must address a number of countervailing facts. First, that the Jewish religious authorities had autonomy to execute heretics (by stoning, not crucification). Second, within all the strains of Second Temple Judaism, the Messiah was seen as a temporal, political savior, not the Christian understanding of a spiritual purifier, and therefore a threat first and foremost to the temporal power of Rome. More than one would-be Messiah was crucified by Rome during the period of Jesus's death.
Finally, to the extent that any possible colloboration between Jews and Romans existed, it would clearly not have involved the forebearers of rabbinic Judasim, the Pharisees. Jerusalem was dominated by the temple-centered Saducees. The Pharisees base of power was centered in the outlying parts of Judea, especially in the Galilee. It is well-documented that the Saducees more than any other sect were the most collusive with the Roman authorities. The Pharisees, on the other hand, clashed with the colonial power, leading their eventual entanglement in the doomed revolts - and the development of pacific ethos by their rabbinnic followers. Thus the chances that any of "our forebearers" involvement are truly slim.
It is one thing to in an academic discussion of the death of Jesus, come to the conclusion intra-Jewish infighting might have played a role. It is something else to require of the Jews, who have sufferred immeassureably from the slander of deicide for over 2000 years to admit to anything. (Nor does Waldman's Jewish ancestry give him leave to do so on the Jews behalf). Jews have every right to "be defensive" about the theological linchpin of Christian anti-semetism. Alas, there is only one party required to look inward on this issue - and that is Christianity. The beauty of that faith, seen everyday in the lives of those who, inspired by Jesus's example, pursue justice and seek holiness, is stained by the slander of the deicide against the Jews and its bloody consequences. No the Jews did not kill Jesus, and until Christianity commits to this truth, a religion that through Jesus shows a path to G-d will keep leading some of its members hopeless astray.
September 10, 2003
THE NOT-SO-SHOCKING FAILURE OF THE ROAD MAP
The massacre in the Cafe Hillel coffeeshop was simply the punctuation mark to the dismal failure of the "Road Map," process, begun with cautious optimism just months ago. The half-way reform of the PA led to a non-existent disarmament of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and al-Aksa, a therefore an inevitable new round of terrorism. The Road Map quickly degenerated into Oslo Redux, with Israel being pressured to make unilateral concessions in order to prop up a Palestinian partner who might someday be able to meet their obligations. In this case the Israeli withdrawals and limited prisoner releases served only to delay the inevitable failure of Abbas.
The "Road Map" initiative was laudable in that it addressed the fundamental flaw in the Oslo process - the lack of a functional Palestinian partner committed to the process. However, the cold, hard truth is that no matter how much Israel, the U.S. or the rest of the world wishes for there to be such a functional partner, one can not emerge from the shambles of post-Oslo Palestinian society, a society that far more radical and dysfunctional than before the disaster of Oslo.
In the end the only real hope for a lasting peace comes from a unilateral separation by Israel, and de-Palestinization of the process. The seperation wall should be built ASAP - roughly along the lines of the Camp David offer, and the settlements beyond the wall dismantled. To wait for a negotiated agreement to begin the needed process of disentangling the populations is a foolhardy stalling tactic that will only prolong the conflict.
In the meantime, with respect to the terror organizations, Israel should continue to do what it should have done long ago - give Hamas, Islamic Jihad and al-Aksa no respite. The targeting killings of terrorist leaders, "political" and otherwise are the most moral response to terror - they are the antithesis of the immorality of the attacks on women, children, shoppers and diners. Better Sheik Yassin make his long overdue appointment in hell than for a Palestinian child to go hungry in response to a fruitless effort to pressure the heartless Arafat and his cronies. There is nothing else Israel can do until a responsible Arab government takes over the responsibility for eliminating Palestinian terror.
Success in the long run requires moving past the fixation on a Palestinian state. The right of self-determination of the Palestinian populations of the West Bank and Gaza would be better addressed by returning them to rule by Egypt or Jordan, which for all their problems, are far more functional than any Palestinian government that could possibly emerge in the next two to three years. While Palestinian self-rule is a nice idea, it is secondary to the more important task of ending the Israeli occupation of Palestinian Arabs.
Unless the next "map", "plan", or "guide" thinks along these fresh lines, and does not try to build once more upon the rubble of Oslo, it will go the way of the roap-map - quickly into the recycling bin of diplomatic failure.
The massacre in the Cafe Hillel coffeeshop was simply the punctuation mark to the dismal failure of the "Road Map," process, begun with cautious optimism just months ago. The half-way reform of the PA led to a non-existent disarmament of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and al-Aksa, a therefore an inevitable new round of terrorism. The Road Map quickly degenerated into Oslo Redux, with Israel being pressured to make unilateral concessions in order to prop up a Palestinian partner who might someday be able to meet their obligations. In this case the Israeli withdrawals and limited prisoner releases served only to delay the inevitable failure of Abbas.
The "Road Map" initiative was laudable in that it addressed the fundamental flaw in the Oslo process - the lack of a functional Palestinian partner committed to the process. However, the cold, hard truth is that no matter how much Israel, the U.S. or the rest of the world wishes for there to be such a functional partner, one can not emerge from the shambles of post-Oslo Palestinian society, a society that far more radical and dysfunctional than before the disaster of Oslo.
In the end the only real hope for a lasting peace comes from a unilateral separation by Israel, and de-Palestinization of the process. The seperation wall should be built ASAP - roughly along the lines of the Camp David offer, and the settlements beyond the wall dismantled. To wait for a negotiated agreement to begin the needed process of disentangling the populations is a foolhardy stalling tactic that will only prolong the conflict.
In the meantime, with respect to the terror organizations, Israel should continue to do what it should have done long ago - give Hamas, Islamic Jihad and al-Aksa no respite. The targeting killings of terrorist leaders, "political" and otherwise are the most moral response to terror - they are the antithesis of the immorality of the attacks on women, children, shoppers and diners. Better Sheik Yassin make his long overdue appointment in hell than for a Palestinian child to go hungry in response to a fruitless effort to pressure the heartless Arafat and his cronies. There is nothing else Israel can do until a responsible Arab government takes over the responsibility for eliminating Palestinian terror.
Success in the long run requires moving past the fixation on a Palestinian state. The right of self-determination of the Palestinian populations of the West Bank and Gaza would be better addressed by returning them to rule by Egypt or Jordan, which for all their problems, are far more functional than any Palestinian government that could possibly emerge in the next two to three years. While Palestinian self-rule is a nice idea, it is secondary to the more important task of ending the Israeli occupation of Palestinian Arabs.
Unless the next "map", "plan", or "guide" thinks along these fresh lines, and does not try to build once more upon the rubble of Oslo, it will go the way of the roap-map - quickly into the recycling bin of diplomatic failure.
September 09, 2003
In anticipation of its full re-launch this October, Off the Pine has moved to its new site michaelpine.com/offthepine.
July 30, 2003
Checking in with the Road Map at the First Rest Stop
As we're now one month into the much balleyhooed hudna, it's a good time to quickly assess the current progress in latest Israel-Palestinian peace initiative.
First, the hudna has held, as the Palestinian terror groups have downshifted into a low-grade attacks mainly on the settlements. This of course had led to the Israeli Right screaming about a lack of Palestinian compliance, to no avail. Everyone knew that what Israel was buying in the cease-fire deal was a respite from large-scale attacks in Israel proper. It has been these attacks that have wrecked a devastating toll both in terms of innocent lives, but also wrecking Israel's economy. All indications show that Hamas, Islamic Jihad & Fatah intend to keep to the hudna for the next couple of months. However, there is still the real possibility of a splinter group torpeding everything with one successful attack.
Second, Abbas has done absolutely nothing to crack down on the terror groups. This of course, is thoroughly unsurprising, given that he would have to win his civil war with Arafat before he could even contemplate such a move. So far, Abbas has been buoyed by the events of the past month. He clearly intends to postpone the inevitable showdown with Arafat for as long as possible, hoping to gather momentum from an improving Palestinian economy no longer choked by Israeli checkpoints.
Third, Sharon is holding firm, despite the increasing pressure on him for unilateral compliance. The easiest concessions, withdrawing to pre-March 2002 positions, he is making. On the settlement issue, he is dragging his feet, rather than pursuing a vigorous outpost removal policy. The pressure is coming to bear hardest however on the release of Paletinian terrorists in Israeli jails. This concession is of course first on the list of the terror organizations, and accordingly a top priority for Abbas & Dahlan who desperate to preserve the hudna. Israeli public opinion, which would happily give away every outpost tommorrow (and for many the actual settlements themselves) rightly do not want to the government to release murderers who will undoubtedly murder again.
Finally, there is the odd spectacle of the Sharon government and the security fence. On the one hand, Sharon correctly stood firm against the diplomatic offensive against the fence by the Europeans and their American wannabes in the State Department. On the other hand, he isn't exactly cracking the whip to get it built. Until it is, however, the temptation for the Palestinian terror groups to once more take the offensive will be too great; and the costs of not building the fence, far too high.
As we're now one month into the much balleyhooed hudna, it's a good time to quickly assess the current progress in latest Israel-Palestinian peace initiative.
First, the hudna has held, as the Palestinian terror groups have downshifted into a low-grade attacks mainly on the settlements. This of course had led to the Israeli Right screaming about a lack of Palestinian compliance, to no avail. Everyone knew that what Israel was buying in the cease-fire deal was a respite from large-scale attacks in Israel proper. It has been these attacks that have wrecked a devastating toll both in terms of innocent lives, but also wrecking Israel's economy. All indications show that Hamas, Islamic Jihad & Fatah intend to keep to the hudna for the next couple of months. However, there is still the real possibility of a splinter group torpeding everything with one successful attack.
Second, Abbas has done absolutely nothing to crack down on the terror groups. This of course, is thoroughly unsurprising, given that he would have to win his civil war with Arafat before he could even contemplate such a move. So far, Abbas has been buoyed by the events of the past month. He clearly intends to postpone the inevitable showdown with Arafat for as long as possible, hoping to gather momentum from an improving Palestinian economy no longer choked by Israeli checkpoints.
Third, Sharon is holding firm, despite the increasing pressure on him for unilateral compliance. The easiest concessions, withdrawing to pre-March 2002 positions, he is making. On the settlement issue, he is dragging his feet, rather than pursuing a vigorous outpost removal policy. The pressure is coming to bear hardest however on the release of Paletinian terrorists in Israeli jails. This concession is of course first on the list of the terror organizations, and accordingly a top priority for Abbas & Dahlan who desperate to preserve the hudna. Israeli public opinion, which would happily give away every outpost tommorrow (and for many the actual settlements themselves) rightly do not want to the government to release murderers who will undoubtedly murder again.
Finally, there is the odd spectacle of the Sharon government and the security fence. On the one hand, Sharon correctly stood firm against the diplomatic offensive against the fence by the Europeans and their American wannabes in the State Department. On the other hand, he isn't exactly cracking the whip to get it built. Until it is, however, the temptation for the Palestinian terror groups to once more take the offensive will be too great; and the costs of not building the fence, far too high.
June 20, 2003
THE ROADMAP: ONE REST STOP AT A TIME
It is far too early to tell whether the recent flurry of diplomatic activity in the Israeli-Arab conflict will result in anything more than an ephemeral breakthrough, despite the metaphorical genius of the Roadmap. The reason for this has little to do with doubts about the current U.S. administration's committment to its initiative, or with Sharon's remarkable gifts for misdirection. At a more fundamental level, the Roadmap is not dead on arrival, ala previous post-Oslo plans (Mitchell, Tenet) because critical steps towards Palestinian reform have happened. The potential for the Roadmap to fizze out like its predecessors remains because that reform was only half-complete. A fully empowered trio of Fayyad controlling the purse strings, Dahlan the security forces and Abbas the politics of the PA is the elusive Palestinain partner Israel has been searching for since the Oslo disaster. This trio, however, at present can not even wrest authority of the PA away from Arafat, let alone eliminate the rejectionist opposition of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the militant wing of Fatah.
This is why it comes as no surprise that Abbas is spearheading the drive for a global cease-fire. Abbas can not match Hamas and Arafat's appeal to the Palestinian's self-destructive passion for ideological purity. He can only build his constituency by delivering concrete, material improvements in the day-to-day conditions of Palestinian life. For this to happen, Abbas needs an Israeli withdrawl. And for that to happen, he needs Hamas to agree to a hudna, because until Dahlan is able to wrest control of the PA's security forces completely from the grasp of Arafat, Abbas lacks the capability of cracking down on Hamas in the wake of a terror attack. This is reason why Israel will swallow the bitter pill of one more Palestinian "unity" pact - with the implicit understanding that such a move will be permitted in Abbas' grace period, but not if it becomes a cornerstone of Abbas' policy.
If Abbas is sucessful at achieving a time-out, Israel will carry out the relatively painless steps required of it in the first phase of the road map. Sharon is firmly ensconsed in the center of Israeli opinion - and the election of Peres as interim Labor leader assures him of the cushion of a unity government in the event of the inevitable exodus of his hard-line coalition partners. Sharon would be wise to use the cease-fire in another way, to complete as much of the West Bank fence as possible. Because whether or not Abbas is able to outmaneuver Arafat in the next coming months, the genocidal mullahs of Hamas will decide to launch another wave of terror attacks. That problem, however, doesn't be addressed until the next rest stop on the Roadmap. After all, even if we don't have peace, we do have a metaphor.
It is far too early to tell whether the recent flurry of diplomatic activity in the Israeli-Arab conflict will result in anything more than an ephemeral breakthrough, despite the metaphorical genius of the Roadmap. The reason for this has little to do with doubts about the current U.S. administration's committment to its initiative, or with Sharon's remarkable gifts for misdirection. At a more fundamental level, the Roadmap is not dead on arrival, ala previous post-Oslo plans (Mitchell, Tenet) because critical steps towards Palestinian reform have happened. The potential for the Roadmap to fizze out like its predecessors remains because that reform was only half-complete. A fully empowered trio of Fayyad controlling the purse strings, Dahlan the security forces and Abbas the politics of the PA is the elusive Palestinain partner Israel has been searching for since the Oslo disaster. This trio, however, at present can not even wrest authority of the PA away from Arafat, let alone eliminate the rejectionist opposition of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the militant wing of Fatah.
This is why it comes as no surprise that Abbas is spearheading the drive for a global cease-fire. Abbas can not match Hamas and Arafat's appeal to the Palestinian's self-destructive passion for ideological purity. He can only build his constituency by delivering concrete, material improvements in the day-to-day conditions of Palestinian life. For this to happen, Abbas needs an Israeli withdrawl. And for that to happen, he needs Hamas to agree to a hudna, because until Dahlan is able to wrest control of the PA's security forces completely from the grasp of Arafat, Abbas lacks the capability of cracking down on Hamas in the wake of a terror attack. This is reason why Israel will swallow the bitter pill of one more Palestinian "unity" pact - with the implicit understanding that such a move will be permitted in Abbas' grace period, but not if it becomes a cornerstone of Abbas' policy.
If Abbas is sucessful at achieving a time-out, Israel will carry out the relatively painless steps required of it in the first phase of the road map. Sharon is firmly ensconsed in the center of Israeli opinion - and the election of Peres as interim Labor leader assures him of the cushion of a unity government in the event of the inevitable exodus of his hard-line coalition partners. Sharon would be wise to use the cease-fire in another way, to complete as much of the West Bank fence as possible. Because whether or not Abbas is able to outmaneuver Arafat in the next coming months, the genocidal mullahs of Hamas will decide to launch another wave of terror attacks. That problem, however, doesn't be addressed until the next rest stop on the Roadmap. After all, even if we don't have peace, we do have a metaphor.
March 16, 2003
SELECTION SUNDAY
Each year, there is no sporting event that delivers upon its promise more than the NCAA Basketball Tournament. For anyone who loves basketball, they are treated to a kaleidoscope of offensive and defensive styles, spectactular individual performances, and exceptional displays of teams performing as far more than the sum of their individual parts.
Yet, there is simply not a more cynical, more venal and more corrupt sporting enterprise than big-time college basketball (with the possible exception of big-time college football). Our insitutions of higher learning in effect rent out disposable, itinerant hoopsters at bargain prices, reaping millions in TV revenues in the process. For the gifted few who go on the play professional basketball, it is fair deal - they receive training and exposure that will present them with a deferred, but generous pay-day. For the rest, however, those whose dreams of NBA stardom (or even journeydom) are illusory and delusional, they receive little of any value. Their scholarships are rendered meaningless by a system that places little to no emphasis on actually providing them with an actual college education. Yet, despite the ever-growing number of wrecked lives and cheated promises by the system, the monitors of the systems focus rather on the whether any of the largesse has somehow slipped down to these so-called student-athletes. And thus, Villanova players' illicit use of university long-distance codes is a scandal - and yet Oklahoma's failure to graduate a single player in the past four years does not prevent them from being labled a "clean" program.
The simple fact is that I, and the other lovers of March Madness, are complicit. It is our viewing that permits the TV revenues that drive the whole system. Therefore, I have come to the following compromise between my love of college basketball as a game, and my loathing of college basketball as a system. I will boycott any game in the tournament that does not include at least one team that has graduated at least 50% of its players over the past four years. This of course eliminates at least 2/3 of the teams that will be playing in this year's tournament. Of the top teams, only Kansas, Duke, Stanford, Notre Dame and Marquette meet this modest goal. It is most likely that I will be forced to miss a stirring finals matchup between Kentucky & Arizona, or Pittsburgh & Texas final. If so, so be it - at least I'll be able to look myself in the mirror.
Each year, there is no sporting event that delivers upon its promise more than the NCAA Basketball Tournament. For anyone who loves basketball, they are treated to a kaleidoscope of offensive and defensive styles, spectactular individual performances, and exceptional displays of teams performing as far more than the sum of their individual parts.
Yet, there is simply not a more cynical, more venal and more corrupt sporting enterprise than big-time college basketball (with the possible exception of big-time college football). Our insitutions of higher learning in effect rent out disposable, itinerant hoopsters at bargain prices, reaping millions in TV revenues in the process. For the gifted few who go on the play professional basketball, it is fair deal - they receive training and exposure that will present them with a deferred, but generous pay-day. For the rest, however, those whose dreams of NBA stardom (or even journeydom) are illusory and delusional, they receive little of any value. Their scholarships are rendered meaningless by a system that places little to no emphasis on actually providing them with an actual college education. Yet, despite the ever-growing number of wrecked lives and cheated promises by the system, the monitors of the systems focus rather on the whether any of the largesse has somehow slipped down to these so-called student-athletes. And thus, Villanova players' illicit use of university long-distance codes is a scandal - and yet Oklahoma's failure to graduate a single player in the past four years does not prevent them from being labled a "clean" program.
The simple fact is that I, and the other lovers of March Madness, are complicit. It is our viewing that permits the TV revenues that drive the whole system. Therefore, I have come to the following compromise between my love of college basketball as a game, and my loathing of college basketball as a system. I will boycott any game in the tournament that does not include at least one team that has graduated at least 50% of its players over the past four years. This of course eliminates at least 2/3 of the teams that will be playing in this year's tournament. Of the top teams, only Kansas, Duke, Stanford, Notre Dame and Marquette meet this modest goal. It is most likely that I will be forced to miss a stirring finals matchup between Kentucky & Arizona, or Pittsburgh & Texas final. If so, so be it - at least I'll be able to look myself in the mirror.
January 29, 2003
THE 2003 ISRAELI ELECTION: THE MORNING AFTER
Here are my thoughts on two major questions rased by yesterday's major re-drawing of the Israeli political map.
1) Is this the end of Labor as we know it?
Yes. The party notched an all-time low of 19 seats. To put this disaster in the proper perspective, in the last single-ballot election, 1992, Labor notched 44 mandates. That's a loss of over a fifth of the electorate. Labor had long since jettisoned anything resembling a discernible domestic policy. It re-emerged in the 1980s as a coaltion of moderate doves - with the dovish and moderates wings in equipoise. However, the party abandoned the doves Oslo gamble, and in the process became the party of Oslo. Labor had one final chance to redefine itself in the wake of Barak's landslide loss to Sharon in the 2001 prime ministerial election. They could have repudiated Oslo without repudiating seperation from the Palestinians. This would require however the party to commit to national unity in face of the Palestinian threat, while simultaneously offering alternative options of separation. Instead, they left a popular unity government, adopted a platform of unconditional negotiations, and ruled out returning to another desperately needed unity government. The coming debate over joining a unity government may very well cause the inevitable fracture of doves and centrists. The doves will join their leader Yossi Beillin as part of a Greater Meretz, and the centrists will follow their constituency out of the party - to Shinui, Likud or another centrist alternative.
2) What's Sharon's best option? How likely is it to happen?
Sharon's best option is a centrist coalition with Labor & Shinui (and the other centrist parties) that adds up to a firm 77-seat majority. This will provide Sharon with cover diplomatically, permit him to finesse the more hawkish members of his party when necessary for popular consensus or relations with the U.S., and significantly create a government with a powerful mandate for domestic reforms - so that he can present the electorate with some sort of progress when the possibility for diplomatic breakthroughs looks bleak over the next few years. This of course would require a wresting of control of Labor from Mitzna, and a willingness for Sharon to tolerate short-term backlash from the religious extremists while reaping longer-term support from the average Israeli.
It is far more likely, however, that Sharon will attempt to put together the same coalition that he just had - with Labor, NRP, Shas and UTJ. (77 seats).
If the Labor doves succeed in keeping the party out of the government, Sharon's best option would be to cobble a compromise between NRP and Shinui on cultural issues (slowly undoing the Haredi welfare system, but not pushing forward with civil marriage), add the two centrist parties, and form a narrow government of 62 mandates. This would put Sharon in a prime position to lure Labor defectors into the government.
Here are my thoughts on two major questions rased by yesterday's major re-drawing of the Israeli political map.
1) Is this the end of Labor as we know it?
Yes. The party notched an all-time low of 19 seats. To put this disaster in the proper perspective, in the last single-ballot election, 1992, Labor notched 44 mandates. That's a loss of over a fifth of the electorate. Labor had long since jettisoned anything resembling a discernible domestic policy. It re-emerged in the 1980s as a coaltion of moderate doves - with the dovish and moderates wings in equipoise. However, the party abandoned the doves Oslo gamble, and in the process became the party of Oslo. Labor had one final chance to redefine itself in the wake of Barak's landslide loss to Sharon in the 2001 prime ministerial election. They could have repudiated Oslo without repudiating seperation from the Palestinians. This would require however the party to commit to national unity in face of the Palestinian threat, while simultaneously offering alternative options of separation. Instead, they left a popular unity government, adopted a platform of unconditional negotiations, and ruled out returning to another desperately needed unity government. The coming debate over joining a unity government may very well cause the inevitable fracture of doves and centrists. The doves will join their leader Yossi Beillin as part of a Greater Meretz, and the centrists will follow their constituency out of the party - to Shinui, Likud or another centrist alternative.
2) What's Sharon's best option? How likely is it to happen?
Sharon's best option is a centrist coalition with Labor & Shinui (and the other centrist parties) that adds up to a firm 77-seat majority. This will provide Sharon with cover diplomatically, permit him to finesse the more hawkish members of his party when necessary for popular consensus or relations with the U.S., and significantly create a government with a powerful mandate for domestic reforms - so that he can present the electorate with some sort of progress when the possibility for diplomatic breakthroughs looks bleak over the next few years. This of course would require a wresting of control of Labor from Mitzna, and a willingness for Sharon to tolerate short-term backlash from the religious extremists while reaping longer-term support from the average Israeli.
It is far more likely, however, that Sharon will attempt to put together the same coalition that he just had - with Labor, NRP, Shas and UTJ. (77 seats).
If the Labor doves succeed in keeping the party out of the government, Sharon's best option would be to cobble a compromise between NRP and Shinui on cultural issues (slowly undoing the Haredi welfare system, but not pushing forward with civil marriage), add the two centrist parties, and form a narrow government of 62 mandates. This would put Sharon in a prime position to lure Labor defectors into the government.
January 28, 2003
THE OFF THE PINE GUIDE TO THE ISRAEL ELECTIONS
Part Three: My Ballot
Today is election day throughout Israel, and alas non-citizen Israeli political junkies do not actually get to vote. Here’s a quick summary of what I’d do with my very own ballot.
The Little Fish
First things, first – there’s simply no way I would vote for a party that might not even pass the threshold, which in Israel is a ridiculously low 1.5% of the electorate. If I wanted to throw my vote away, I’d move to D.C. I’ll break them down accordingly:
Those with no chance, that I’ve never heard of: Ahavat Yisrael, Citizen and State, Lahava, Leeder, Organization for Democratic Action, Progressive National Alliance, and Za’am.
Those with no chance, that I’ve heard of: Center (what’s left of it after all but one MK jumped to Shinui and Likud), Gesher, Greens, Ra’ash (Men’s Rights in Family – not making that one up), Tzomet, and Another Israel (A new generation of Israeli leaders – with no followers).
Those with a chance: Green Leaf (endorsed by High Times Magazine), Herut (right-wing fanatics who could use a little green leaf to chill out).
The Longshots
United Arab List & Balad (1999: 7, Projected 6-8)
Why: The yawning gap in services between the Jewish and Arab sectors
Why Not: Seem more interested in the well being of Assad, Hezbollah and Arafat than their own voters.
Hadash (1999:3, Projected 2-3)
Why: A joint Arab-Jewish list!!!
Why Not: Communism (see failed experiments throughout world 1917-1989)
National Unity (1999:8, Projected 8-10)
Why: They have a clear plan for how Israel should resolve the Palestinian conflict
Why Not: It bears a striking similarity to Milosevic's plan to resolve the Kosovo conflict
Torah and Shabbat Judaism (1999: 5, Projected 4-5)
Why: I’m a big fan of Torah and Shabbat
Why Not: Not as they practice it (e.g. pelting egalitarian services with stones)
Shas (1999: 17; Projected 10-13)
Why: While I’m not a traditional Sephardi immigrant – I feel their pain
Why Not: Would you want a party that combined the worst of Al Sharpton and Pat Robertson controlling a fifth of your government?
One Nation (1999: 2; Projected 2-3)
Why: They stand up for the working man in an increasingly global Israeli economy
Why Not: Israel’s unions are so strong that one of things I was taught in Ulpan was the word for strike (shvita).
National Religious Party (1999:5; Projected 4-5)
Why: Their great heritage as a bridge between secular Zionists and religious Jews
Why Not: A large portion of their voters have been suffering from Jerusalem Syndrome since around 1967.
Meretz (1999:9; Projected 7-10)
Why: A deep commitment to environmental protection, education reform, and rights for ethnic and religious minorities (including liberal Judaism)
Why Not: Israel happens to be in the Middle East, not Europe or North America. The dovish Meretzniks seem to be in denial about this fact (or like Yossi Beillin too smart to comprehend the self-destructive behavior of the PA after Oslo).
The Contenders
Labor (1999:26; Projected 18-20)
Why: They built the country. For years, they produced pragmatic leaders such as Ben Gurion, Eshkol, Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin that combined vigilance with openness towards peace.
Why Not: They're led by Amnon Mitzna - who has come out 1) in favor of negotiating with Arafat, and 2) against sitting in a national unity government. This is not a responsible way for Labor to help clean up the Oslo mess they made.
Likud (1999:19; Projected 30-33)
Why: Sharon managed to stamp down the Palestinian offensive while maintaining national unity and Israel’s relationship with the U.S.
Why Not: Only Sharon knows what Sharon’s long-term plan is. An unwillingness to distinguish the Gaza settlements from Greater Jerusalem, or halt the expansion of settlements is disconcerting. Sharon will take only as many “painful steps” as the rest of his coalition forces him to take.
Shinui (1999:6; Projected 13-16)
Why: For years, Ultra-Orthodox parties have played the two major parties against each other to obtain a stranglehold of the issues of personal status, squeeze the Israeli budget dry to subsidize their yeshiva-schnorr lifestyle, and promote their fundamentalist version of Judaism. Shinui is the first party take on that challenge directly, by offering itself as an alternate swing party. They also happen to fallen into the sensible center on security issues, almost by default.
Why Not: Their anti-Orthodox rhetoric often crosses the line to blackhataphobia.
Yisrael B’Aliyah (1999:6; Projected: 3-6)
Why Not: I’m contributing to the chaos of Israel politics by strengthening a small party.
Why: With Sharon a lock to repeat as prime minister, I have the luxury of not having to vote for the big party I dislike the least. Quite simply, I believe Israel benefits tremendously from having Natan Sharansky in the cabinet. He was the first major politician to realize the futility of negotiating with an autocratic Palestinian partner. His party seeks to restore secular-religious balance without divisive rhetoric. I’m a softy for ex-refusniks.
So if you see Natan, tell him I would have voted for him – if I could have voted.
Part Three: My Ballot
Today is election day throughout Israel, and alas non-citizen Israeli political junkies do not actually get to vote. Here’s a quick summary of what I’d do with my very own ballot.
The Little Fish
First things, first – there’s simply no way I would vote for a party that might not even pass the threshold, which in Israel is a ridiculously low 1.5% of the electorate. If I wanted to throw my vote away, I’d move to D.C. I’ll break them down accordingly:
Those with no chance, that I’ve never heard of: Ahavat Yisrael, Citizen and State, Lahava, Leeder, Organization for Democratic Action, Progressive National Alliance, and Za’am.
Those with no chance, that I’ve heard of: Center (what’s left of it after all but one MK jumped to Shinui and Likud), Gesher, Greens, Ra’ash (Men’s Rights in Family – not making that one up), Tzomet, and Another Israel (A new generation of Israeli leaders – with no followers).
Those with a chance: Green Leaf (endorsed by High Times Magazine), Herut (right-wing fanatics who could use a little green leaf to chill out).
The Longshots
United Arab List & Balad (1999: 7, Projected 6-8)
Why: The yawning gap in services between the Jewish and Arab sectors
Why Not: Seem more interested in the well being of Assad, Hezbollah and Arafat than their own voters.
Hadash (1999:3, Projected 2-3)
Why: A joint Arab-Jewish list!!!
Why Not: Communism (see failed experiments throughout world 1917-1989)
National Unity (1999:8, Projected 8-10)
Why: They have a clear plan for how Israel should resolve the Palestinian conflict
Why Not: It bears a striking similarity to Milosevic's plan to resolve the Kosovo conflict
Torah and Shabbat Judaism (1999: 5, Projected 4-5)
Why: I’m a big fan of Torah and Shabbat
Why Not: Not as they practice it (e.g. pelting egalitarian services with stones)
Shas (1999: 17; Projected 10-13)
Why: While I’m not a traditional Sephardi immigrant – I feel their pain
Why Not: Would you want a party that combined the worst of Al Sharpton and Pat Robertson controlling a fifth of your government?
One Nation (1999: 2; Projected 2-3)
Why: They stand up for the working man in an increasingly global Israeli economy
Why Not: Israel’s unions are so strong that one of things I was taught in Ulpan was the word for strike (shvita).
National Religious Party (1999:5; Projected 4-5)
Why: Their great heritage as a bridge between secular Zionists and religious Jews
Why Not: A large portion of their voters have been suffering from Jerusalem Syndrome since around 1967.
Meretz (1999:9; Projected 7-10)
Why: A deep commitment to environmental protection, education reform, and rights for ethnic and religious minorities (including liberal Judaism)
Why Not: Israel happens to be in the Middle East, not Europe or North America. The dovish Meretzniks seem to be in denial about this fact (or like Yossi Beillin too smart to comprehend the self-destructive behavior of the PA after Oslo).
The Contenders
Labor (1999:26; Projected 18-20)
Why: They built the country. For years, they produced pragmatic leaders such as Ben Gurion, Eshkol, Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin that combined vigilance with openness towards peace.
Why Not: They're led by Amnon Mitzna - who has come out 1) in favor of negotiating with Arafat, and 2) against sitting in a national unity government. This is not a responsible way for Labor to help clean up the Oslo mess they made.
Likud (1999:19; Projected 30-33)
Why: Sharon managed to stamp down the Palestinian offensive while maintaining national unity and Israel’s relationship with the U.S.
Why Not: Only Sharon knows what Sharon’s long-term plan is. An unwillingness to distinguish the Gaza settlements from Greater Jerusalem, or halt the expansion of settlements is disconcerting. Sharon will take only as many “painful steps” as the rest of his coalition forces him to take.
Shinui (1999:6; Projected 13-16)
Why: For years, Ultra-Orthodox parties have played the two major parties against each other to obtain a stranglehold of the issues of personal status, squeeze the Israeli budget dry to subsidize their yeshiva-schnorr lifestyle, and promote their fundamentalist version of Judaism. Shinui is the first party take on that challenge directly, by offering itself as an alternate swing party. They also happen to fallen into the sensible center on security issues, almost by default.
Why Not: Their anti-Orthodox rhetoric often crosses the line to blackhataphobia.
Yisrael B’Aliyah (1999:6; Projected: 3-6)
Why Not: I’m contributing to the chaos of Israel politics by strengthening a small party.
Why: With Sharon a lock to repeat as prime minister, I have the luxury of not having to vote for the big party I dislike the least. Quite simply, I believe Israel benefits tremendously from having Natan Sharansky in the cabinet. He was the first major politician to realize the futility of negotiating with an autocratic Palestinian partner. His party seeks to restore secular-religious balance without divisive rhetoric. I’m a softy for ex-refusniks.
So if you see Natan, tell him I would have voted for him – if I could have voted.
January 27, 2003
THE OFF THE PINE GUIDE TO THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS Part Two: The 2003 Campaign
The Primaries:
Sharon easily held off a challenge from Bibi in the Likud primary vote for prime minister, and Bibi wisely decided to accept the role as No.2 in the party and heir-apparent. In early December, Likud appeared on the bring of a staggering victory, with over 40 mandates a realistic goal. The Likud general primary (which is really more of a caucus) became a wide-open free-for-all, attracting newcomers to the party to compete for the plentiful number of new seats to be had in the next Knesset. The results of the Likud primary proved head-scratching, as minor politicos placed much higher than party luminaries such as Jerusalem Mayor Ehud Olmert. It was soon emerged that the reason behind the odd result was a massive vote-buying scandal, which served to clip Likud’s wings as it entered the general election.
Labor, on the other hand, was coming apart at the seams. In the aftermath of the collapse of Oslo and Sharon’s trouncing of Barak, Labor, led by Shimon Peres and Benjamen Ben-Eliezer brough the party into a national government headed by Sharon. The Labor hawks, led by Ben-Eliezer, defended the move as essential to the national interest in a time of war and that the stamping out of the Palestinian offensive was a precursor to any serious progress towards peace. The Labor doves, led by Yossi Beilin, denounced the decision as an abandonment of Labor’s core principles, as well as a blurring of Labor’s political identity. In the primaries, the Labor rank and file proved to be as conflicted and divided as their leadership. Haifa mayor Amnon Mitzna, a staunch dove who advocated unconditional negotiations with Arafat and unilateral withdrawal from the territories as a fall-back, was voted in as the Labor candidate for prime minister. Only weeks later, however, in the general primary, Labor voters handed the Labor hawks a decisive victory over the Labor doves. Beillin himself received such a low spot on the Labor list that he defected to Meretz shortly thereafter. Labor therefore entered the general campaign as muddled as it had been before the primaries.
The General Campaign:
Things went from bad to worse for Likud in the end of December, when it was rocked by yet another scandal, this time involving Sharon’s use of foreign funds in his 2001 campaign. By January 9, Likud was polling at only 27 seats, a mere 3 more than listless Labor. Two recent events, however, radically reversed this trend. First, the Israel Election Commission pulled the plug on a Sharon press conference called to address the scandal charges for violating Israel’s election propaganda law. Likud supporters who had been turned off by the scandals, were incensed, and rallied around the prime minister. Second, Mitzna announced that Labor would not join another national unity government under Sharon. This pretty much killed what little momentum Labor had. With a week to go before the election, Likud had extended its lead back to 12 seats.
The main beneficiaries of the stumbles of Labor and Likud have been the sectarian and special interest parties - the very ones who appeared endangered by the return to the old system. Instead the secularist Shinui party appears to be on the verge of doubling or even tripling its current 6 seats. Meanwhile, the religious Shas party, which in early polls was projected to lose half of its 17 seats, has rebounded in the past few weeks, not the least because of Shinui’s surge. Polls show that parties to the left of Labor and right of Likud will maintain their current strength, and that the Arab parties will not suffer from a possible boycott (with fizzled with the Israeli Supreme Court’s decision to permit Ahmed Tibi and Azmi Bishara to run). Plenty of votes remained up for grabs - with even the pro-ganga Green Leafers holding on to a realistic chance of a mandate.
The continuing success of the sectarian parties, in light of the return to the one-ballot system and dominance of the security situation, needs further explaination. Their gains in the past two elections were fueled by Oslo-inspired optimism towards peace – that Israel could now afford to address its long-neglected domestic disputes. The Oslo War has replaced the optimism of the 1990s with a profound pessimism, yet the sectarian parties strength remains intact. In a sense, many Israeli voters seem to be sending the message that they don’t believe any proffered solution will solve the country’s foreign problems any time soon, so the country might as well address its domestic problems in the interim. (Another factor may be that the absence of a competitive race for the largest party with the collapse of Labor). The end result is instead of a return to the two major party dynamic of the 1980s, a four-party dynamic of Likud, Labor, Shinui and Shas has emerged. As a result, Ariel Sharon will face an exceptionally difficult task of putting together a stable, cohesive government.
The Primaries:
Sharon easily held off a challenge from Bibi in the Likud primary vote for prime minister, and Bibi wisely decided to accept the role as No.2 in the party and heir-apparent. In early December, Likud appeared on the bring of a staggering victory, with over 40 mandates a realistic goal. The Likud general primary (which is really more of a caucus) became a wide-open free-for-all, attracting newcomers to the party to compete for the plentiful number of new seats to be had in the next Knesset. The results of the Likud primary proved head-scratching, as minor politicos placed much higher than party luminaries such as Jerusalem Mayor Ehud Olmert. It was soon emerged that the reason behind the odd result was a massive vote-buying scandal, which served to clip Likud’s wings as it entered the general election.
Labor, on the other hand, was coming apart at the seams. In the aftermath of the collapse of Oslo and Sharon’s trouncing of Barak, Labor, led by Shimon Peres and Benjamen Ben-Eliezer brough the party into a national government headed by Sharon. The Labor hawks, led by Ben-Eliezer, defended the move as essential to the national interest in a time of war and that the stamping out of the Palestinian offensive was a precursor to any serious progress towards peace. The Labor doves, led by Yossi Beilin, denounced the decision as an abandonment of Labor’s core principles, as well as a blurring of Labor’s political identity. In the primaries, the Labor rank and file proved to be as conflicted and divided as their leadership. Haifa mayor Amnon Mitzna, a staunch dove who advocated unconditional negotiations with Arafat and unilateral withdrawal from the territories as a fall-back, was voted in as the Labor candidate for prime minister. Only weeks later, however, in the general primary, Labor voters handed the Labor hawks a decisive victory over the Labor doves. Beillin himself received such a low spot on the Labor list that he defected to Meretz shortly thereafter. Labor therefore entered the general campaign as muddled as it had been before the primaries.
The General Campaign:
Things went from bad to worse for Likud in the end of December, when it was rocked by yet another scandal, this time involving Sharon’s use of foreign funds in his 2001 campaign. By January 9, Likud was polling at only 27 seats, a mere 3 more than listless Labor. Two recent events, however, radically reversed this trend. First, the Israel Election Commission pulled the plug on a Sharon press conference called to address the scandal charges for violating Israel’s election propaganda law. Likud supporters who had been turned off by the scandals, were incensed, and rallied around the prime minister. Second, Mitzna announced that Labor would not join another national unity government under Sharon. This pretty much killed what little momentum Labor had. With a week to go before the election, Likud had extended its lead back to 12 seats.
The main beneficiaries of the stumbles of Labor and Likud have been the sectarian and special interest parties - the very ones who appeared endangered by the return to the old system. Instead the secularist Shinui party appears to be on the verge of doubling or even tripling its current 6 seats. Meanwhile, the religious Shas party, which in early polls was projected to lose half of its 17 seats, has rebounded in the past few weeks, not the least because of Shinui’s surge. Polls show that parties to the left of Labor and right of Likud will maintain their current strength, and that the Arab parties will not suffer from a possible boycott (with fizzled with the Israeli Supreme Court’s decision to permit Ahmed Tibi and Azmi Bishara to run). Plenty of votes remained up for grabs - with even the pro-ganga Green Leafers holding on to a realistic chance of a mandate.
The continuing success of the sectarian parties, in light of the return to the one-ballot system and dominance of the security situation, needs further explaination. Their gains in the past two elections were fueled by Oslo-inspired optimism towards peace – that Israel could now afford to address its long-neglected domestic disputes. The Oslo War has replaced the optimism of the 1990s with a profound pessimism, yet the sectarian parties strength remains intact. In a sense, many Israeli voters seem to be sending the message that they don’t believe any proffered solution will solve the country’s foreign problems any time soon, so the country might as well address its domestic problems in the interim. (Another factor may be that the absence of a competitive race for the largest party with the collapse of Labor). The end result is instead of a return to the two major party dynamic of the 1980s, a four-party dynamic of Likud, Labor, Shinui and Shas has emerged. As a result, Ariel Sharon will face an exceptionally difficult task of putting together a stable, cohesive government.
January 26, 2003
The Old-New System:
Up until 1996, Israel had a straightforward parliamentary system, in which voters cast one ballot for the 120-seat Knesset, and parties were assigned seats based on their proportion of the national vote. The leader of the party with the most seats then had the first opportunity to form a government by building a coalition of parties amounting to a majority. The leader of the largest party in the government (which in most cases was the largest party) would then become prime minister.
For the 1996 election, Israel switched to a unique process where voters cast one ballot in a direct election of the prime minister, and a second ballot for the Knesset. This reform strengthened the prime minister, who had a popular mandate to fall back upon, but devastated both major parties, as voters had the option to vote for the prime minister whose security platform they trusted, and for the party that addressed their social, cultural and economic concerns. (Labor & Likud’s joint total fell from 72 seats in 1992 to 45 seats in 1999).
With the return of the pure parliamentary system, there was a potential for radically reversing the trends of the last two elections, especially in an post-Oslo context where national security was once more the dominant issue on the national agenda.
The Oslo War:
In the late 1990s, the stranglehold of national security issues over the Israeli political agenda appeared to have lifted. The internal fissures in Israeli society, most notably the split between secular and religious Jews had taken center stage. The 1990s boom had remade the Israeli economy as a high-tech export power, but also radically increased the inequality between rich and poor, urban coast and the rest of the country. All these issues have been buried by the Oslo War, which was launched in October 2000 as violent repudiation of the Israeli offer at Camp David. The war brought about a number of previously unthinkable events: the political resurrection of Ariel Sharon, the Labor-Likud unity government, and the eventual reoccupation of most of the territories in the aftermath of the Palestinians’ brutal Spring 2002 terror offensive. Thus, in a way, not only was Israel returning to its pre-Olso political system, it was also returning to its pre-Oslo politics centered on issues of national security.
This was the backdrop to the election - a golden opportunity for Likud to establish itself as Israel's ruling party, and for Labor to consolidate its position as the principal contender for that role. As the increasing chaotic campaign season progressed, it became more and more apparent that the two major parties were squandering these opportunities.