THE OFF THE PINE GUIDE TO THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS Part Two: The 2003 Campaign



The Primaries:

Sharon easily held off a challenge from Bibi in the Likud primary vote for prime minister, and Bibi wisely decided to accept the role as No.2 in the party and heir-apparent. In early December, Likud appeared on the bring of a staggering victory, with over 40 mandates a realistic goal. The Likud general primary (which is really more of a caucus) became a wide-open free-for-all, attracting newcomers to the party to compete for the plentiful number of new seats to be had in the next Knesset. The results of the Likud primary proved head-scratching, as minor politicos placed much higher than party luminaries such as Jerusalem Mayor Ehud Olmert. It was soon emerged that the reason behind the odd result was a massive vote-buying scandal, which served to clip Likud’s wings as it entered the general election.


Labor, on the other hand, was coming apart at the seams. In the aftermath of the collapse of Oslo and Sharon’s trouncing of Barak, Labor, led by Shimon Peres and Benjamen Ben-Eliezer brough the party into a national government headed by Sharon. The Labor hawks, led by Ben-Eliezer, defended the move as essential to the national interest in a time of war and that the stamping out of the Palestinian offensive was a precursor to any serious progress towards peace. The Labor doves, led by Yossi Beilin, denounced the decision as an abandonment of Labor’s core principles, as well as a blurring of Labor’s political identity. In the primaries, the Labor rank and file proved to be as conflicted and divided as their leadership. Haifa mayor Amnon Mitzna, a staunch dove who advocated unconditional negotiations with Arafat and unilateral withdrawal from the territories as a fall-back, was voted in as the Labor candidate for prime minister. Only weeks later, however, in the general primary, Labor voters handed the Labor hawks a decisive victory over the Labor doves. Beillin himself received such a low spot on the Labor list that he defected to Meretz shortly thereafter. Labor therefore entered the general campaign as muddled as it had been before the primaries.


The General Campaign:

Things went from bad to worse for Likud in the end of December, when it was rocked by yet another scandal, this time involving Sharon’s use of foreign funds in his 2001 campaign. By January 9, Likud was polling at only 27 seats, a mere 3 more than listless Labor. Two recent events, however, radically reversed this trend. First, the Israel Election Commission pulled the plug on a Sharon press conference called to address the scandal charges for violating Israel’s election propaganda law. Likud supporters who had been turned off by the scandals, were incensed, and rallied around the prime minister. Second, Mitzna announced that Labor would not join another national unity government under Sharon. This pretty much killed what little momentum Labor had. With a week to go before the election, Likud had extended its lead back to 12 seats.


The main beneficiaries of the stumbles of Labor and Likud have been the sectarian and special interest parties - the very ones who appeared endangered by the return to the old system. Instead the secularist Shinui party appears to be on the verge of doubling or even tripling its current 6 seats. Meanwhile, the religious Shas party, which in early polls was projected to lose half of its 17 seats, has rebounded in the past few weeks, not the least because of Shinui’s surge. Polls show that parties to the left of Labor and right of Likud will maintain their current strength, and that the Arab parties will not suffer from a possible boycott (with fizzled with the Israeli Supreme Court’s decision to permit Ahmed Tibi and Azmi Bishara to run). Plenty of votes remained up for grabs - with even the pro-ganga Green Leafers holding on to a realistic chance of a mandate.


The continuing success of the sectarian parties, in light of the return to the one-ballot system and dominance of the security situation, needs further explaination. Their gains in the past two elections were fueled by Oslo-inspired optimism towards peace – that Israel could now afford to address its long-neglected domestic disputes. The Oslo War has replaced the optimism of the 1990s with a profound pessimism, yet the sectarian parties strength remains intact. In a sense, many Israeli voters seem to be sending the message that they don’t believe any proffered solution will solve the country’s foreign problems any time soon, so the country might as well address its domestic problems in the interim. (Another factor may be that the absence of a competitive race for the largest party with the collapse of Labor). The end result is instead of a return to the two major party dynamic of the 1980s, a four-party dynamic of Likud, Labor, Shinui and Shas has emerged. As a result, Ariel Sharon will face an exceptionally difficult task of putting together a stable, cohesive government.