THE OFF THE PINE GUIDE TO THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS Part One: The First Post-Oslo Election


The Old-New System:

Up until 1996, Israel had a straightforward parliamentary system, in which voters cast one ballot for the 120-seat Knesset, and parties were assigned seats based on their proportion of the national vote. The leader of the party with the most seats then had the first opportunity to form a government by building a coalition of parties amounting to a majority. The leader of the largest party in the government (which in most cases was the largest party) would then become prime minister.


For the 1996 election, Israel switched to a unique process where voters cast one ballot in a direct election of the prime minister, and a second ballot for the Knesset. This reform strengthened the prime minister, who had a popular mandate to fall back upon, but devastated both major parties, as voters had the option to vote for the prime minister whose security platform they trusted, and for the party that addressed their social, cultural and economic concerns. (Labor & Likud’s joint total fell from 72 seats in 1992 to 45 seats in 1999).


With the return of the pure parliamentary system, there was a potential for radically reversing the trends of the last two elections, especially in an post-Oslo context where national security was once more the dominant issue on the national agenda.


The Oslo War:

In the late 1990s, the stranglehold of national security issues over the Israeli political agenda appeared to have lifted. The internal fissures in Israeli society, most notably the split between secular and religious Jews had taken center stage. The 1990s boom had remade the Israeli economy as a high-tech export power, but also radically increased the inequality between rich and poor, urban coast and the rest of the country. All these issues have been buried by the Oslo War, which was launched in October 2000 as violent repudiation of the Israeli offer at Camp David. The war brought about a number of previously unthinkable events: the political resurrection of Ariel Sharon, the Labor-Likud unity government, and the eventual reoccupation of most of the territories in the aftermath of the Palestinians’ brutal Spring 2002 terror offensive. Thus, in a way, not only was Israel returning to its pre-Olso political system, it was also returning to its pre-Oslo politics centered on issues of national security.


This was the backdrop to the election - a golden opportunity for Likud to establish itself as Israel's ruling party, and for Labor to consolidate its position as the principal contender for that role. As the increasing chaotic campaign season progressed, it became more and more apparent that the two major parties were squandering these opportunities.