THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY OF MIDEAST PUNDITRY
The Good: Warren Bass v. the Wall
In the best of the three pieces, the Council of Foreign Relations
Warren Bass attacks the idea of a West Bank wall as a silver bullet for peace and security.
Third, the security impact of a fence depends on where it is built. Tellingly, nobody has yet offered a map. Barak has vaguely proposed a fence running close to the borders he futilely offered Arafat at Camp David—a curling wall far longer than the 190-mile Green Line, swooping in to annex settlements in Gush Etzion, Ariel, and other places relatively close to Israel proper. But Likud has deliberately plunked other settlements close to Palestinian population centers to foreclose any future Israeli withdrawal. These settlements are filled not with middle-class, center-right Israelis lured across the Green Line by tax breaks and cheap mortgages—the profile of most of the 200,000 settlers—but by ideologues, messianists, and haters.
Leaving 50,000 hard-core settlers on far-flung hilltops while Israel proper barricades itself is a security problem from hell. With a wall, "every settler who wants to do their shopping will have to be accompanied by a squad of soldiers," says Gal Luft, a former IDF lieutenant colonel who has held commands in Gaza and Ramallah. Instead of stopping Palestinian terrorism, a wall might just rechannel it against the settlements—putting Israel in the excruciating position of either pummeling the Palestinians to get them to stop attacking settlements Israel knows it can't keep or abandoning the settlements and reinforcing the lesson that terror can win territory.
And that, ultimately, is the biggest reason to worry about the enthusiasm for a fence: It reinforces unilateralism and helps defer indefinitely the only possible solution—negotiated partition—that has any reasonable chance of bringing peace. Unilateral disengagement by Israel would replace the land-for-peace premise of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 with land-for-violence; gut the long-standing Israeli insistence that negotiations are the lone legitimate way to resolve Arab-Israeli tensions; encourage Palestinian militance; reinforce Hezbollah's crowing insistence that force works and talks don't; and make Jerusalem and the rest of the new frontier into a new front line.
While I agree with Bass that merely building a wall will not give Israel the peace and security it craves, I disagree with his position that such an action will actually get in the way of a peaceful resolution. First, Bass' proposed alternative, negotiated partition is impossible at the present moment. There simply is not a viable Palestinian peace partner. Second, more than anything else it will create momentum towards the creation of a border. It may not be the border the Palestinians desire (if it really is the 1967 borders they crave), but it will clearly demarcate lands Israel intends to annex, and lands Israel intends to turn over to a Palestinian state. Third, it will increase the likelihood of an evacuation of the isolated settlements. Once the suburban settlements have been incorporated into Israel proper, there will be little popular support to waste time, money and manpower on the defense of ideological extremist. Fourth, in the case that the isolated settlements are evacuated unilaterally, it is unclear that this will permanently strengthen the militants. The carrot of statehood would be realer than ever for Palestinian moderates, and the cost higher than ever for Palestinian militancy.
Still, Bass' piece points out that without economic and political development for the Palestinians, a true peace is impossible. Good fences may help to make good neighbors, but so does both houses having running water, electricity and enough cash to pay the gardener.
The Bad: Robert Wright v. Sharon's View of Arafat
As good as Bass' piece is,
Robert Wright's latest contribution is bad. Once more it shows off his penchant for abstract logic, and his complete lack of depth in the messy details of the conflict.
For years, during waves of Palestinian terrorism, the question has been the same: Is Arafat unable to control terrorism or just unwilling? Sharon and other hawks have said he was unwilling, while many doves said he was unable.
Both positions have always lacked coherence. Doves called on Israel to negotiate with Arafat. Yet if Arafat is indeed powerless to stop terrorism, as they've claimed, what's the point of negotiating with him? Hawks said that, since Arafat was behind the terrorism, he could never be a "partner for peace." But what would be the point of cutting a deal with somebody who wasn't in a position to turn the terrorism off? The evidence Sharon says he now has in hand is, perversely, evidence that Arafat is a man worth doing business with
While Wright suceeds in demolishing the dovish position - and its more nuanced version (the more power you give Arafat a state, the more ability he will have to crack down on terror), he trips over himself trying to dismiss the core of the hawkish position - that Arafat never has and never will desire to crack down on terror.
Granting that Arafat is by their own analysis the man who could end the terror, they've insisted that he'd never want to end Israel's suffering; he didn't favor a two-state solution, as he claimed, but was secretly bent on Israel's destruction. A key piece of supporting evidence—Arafat's rejection of Israel's offer at Camp David in the summer of 2000—has been widely accepted. But, as I've argued in these pages, this evidence just doesn't stand up to close scrutiny. Though we can't be sure Arafat wants a two-state deal, he has yet to be offered a deal so good that his reaction would settle the question.
As I've argued in the past,
Wright's Camp David revisionism is what doesn't stand up to close scrutiny. Second, it takes the most complex of contortions to fit Arafat's reaction to Camp David with that of a man who wanted to negotiate a two-state solution but was simply offered less than what he desired. Of course, Arafat's intent is even clearer when one takes in the full pattern of his post-Oslo behavior. Once more, Wright wishes to ignore the facts that get in the way of the elegance of his point.
Nor can you infer from any Arafat involvement in recent terrorism that he can't ever be trusted to carry out a deal. Obviously, terrorism violates the Oslo accords. But those accords, signed in 1993, have been effectively dead for awhile now. You could have a long argument about which side is more responsible for the unraveling of trust that spelled Oslo's doom.
I suppose if you gave equal credibility to Israeli and Palestinian claims. The facts present a far less murky picture.
Israeli violations of Oslo: Missing deadlines for the phased withdrawls in retalition for Palestinian noncompliance. Incursion into Palestinian Area A (Post-2000) in response to Palestinian terror. The expansion of settlements, while violating the spirit of Oslo, did ot violate the terms of the agreement.
Palestinian violations of Oslo: Violating the limits on the size and armament of the Palestinian police force. Incitement against Israel in state educational system and media. Permitting the existence of non-govermental armed forces and terror organizations. Failure to extradite wanted terrorists. Subsidization of terror attacks. Direct involvement in terror attacks (Post-2000).
The logical conclusion from Arafat's actions pre, during and post the Oslo process is that he never gave up his desire to destroy Israel, and merely used negotiations as a tool to advance his agenda. Wright paints a different picture.
Might it turn out that, even years ago, Arafat was tacitly abetting terrorism? Wouldn't shock me—and he certainly wasn't taking huge political risks to shut it down. But to take that as a sign of some ideological, immutable drive to undermine Israel is to give Arafat more credit for vision than he deserves. I read him as someone who will do anything to stay in power and has very short time horizons; with Palestinians growing more radical, he has embraced or at least tolerated terrorism as a way of maintaining street cred, heedless of the long-term consequences.
Yes, Arafat loves to keep his opinions open, he is a chameleon, a survivor - but to say that he has no vision for a Palestinian state is simply nonsense. The clincher here is how he used the levers of state education and media. Only a naiive man believes Arafat merely was led by the Palestinian street - he very much led it, preparing them daily for war against Israel.
Finally, Wright concludes that since Arafat is 1) behind the terror, 2) capable of stopping it, and 3) a pragmatist who puts his own power over any ideological concerns, Israel should therefore: offer him a state. Huh? Look, even if I bought 2 and 3, Wright's conclusion is a nonsensical leap of faith. Given 1,2, and 3, the appropriate approach requires not just a carrot but a stick. Stop terror: get a state. Abet terror, commit terror: be replaced. Which is exactly what Israel and U.S. should do once they find a true pragmatist to take Arafat's place.
The Ugly: John Derbyshire v. Compassion
And from the National Review, we get this harsh piece on why Derbyshire
could care less about the Palestinians.
This piece is ugly in two ways - first it hits some of the ugly truths about the Arab World
Everywhere you look around the Arab world you see squalor, despotism, cruelty, and hopelessness. The best they have been able to manage, politically speaking, has been the Latin-American style one-party kleptocracies of Egypt and Jordan. Those are the peaks of Arab political achievement under independence, under government by their own people. The norm is just gangsterism, with thugs like Assad, Qaddafi, or Saddam in charge. It doesn't seem to be anything to do with religion: the secular states (Iraq, Syria) are just as horrible as the religious ones like Saudi Arabia. These people are hopeless. We are all supposed to support the notion of a Palestinian state. Why? We know perfectly well what it would be like. Why should we wish for another gangster-satrapy to be added to the Arab roll of shame, busy manufacturing terrorists to come here and slaughter Americans in their offices? I don't want to see a Palestinian state. I think I'd be crazy to want that.
Taking the counterfactual of no Zionist movement, things would be far worse for the Jews, but how much better would they really be for the Palestinians? OK, so far ugly, but true. Here's where he goes past political incorrectness towards a far uglier stance: supporting the morally bankrupt position of expelling the Palestinians.
When I say "the best option," I don't mean "best for the Palestinians". I don't think they have any good options. Being Arabs, they are incapable of constructing a rational polity, so their future is probably hopeless whatever happens. Their options are the ones I listed above: to be ruled by gangsters, or Israelis, or Jordanians, or welfare bureaucrats. Or to go live somewhere else, under the gentle rule of their brother Arabs. Would expulsion be hard on the Palestinians? I suppose it would. Would it be any harder than options 1 thru 4? I doubt it. Do I really give a flying falafel one way or the other? No, not really.
First and foremost, the idea that "Arab are incapable of constructing a rational polity" is racist. The same sentiments were said abou the Japanese during World War II. Given the right contex, Arabs are just as capable of creating a functioning democracy. After all, their polities were far more rational in the Middle Ages than the barbarism of Christian Europe. What is needed is for the United States to truly commit to democratization in that troubled corner of the world.
Finally, the Palestinian's conquerors are Jews. Their fate is interlocked with ours. While the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians might deserve only a footnote in history's injustices, it would be by far the largest stain on our record. As Jews, we are prohibited from dehumanizing even our enemies. For us to do to the Palestinians what has been done to us so many times in history will show that we have learned nothing from our painful travels. No, it very much does matter how this conflict is resolved - all the options are not morally equivalent. And it very much does matter that it end with a dignified existence for the Palestinians.