HOW LIBERALS LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE THE MILITARY BRASS

Joshua Micah Marshall has a problem. He's a liberal pundit - which means that every natural instinct within him is screaming for him to oppose the war against Iraq. However, he happens to be an exceptionally intelligent and intellectually honest liberal pundit, which has led him to conclude that a military intervention to enact regime change in Iraq is a sound policy objective. Since reaching that conclusion, Marshall has suffered an ongoing internal struggle, pulled in opposite directions by his political insticts and policy analysis. His first attempt at a compromise, laid out at the end of his Washington Monthly piece was to argue for a division of labor - with the neocon ideologues (who were right about Afghanistan) in charge of setting the broad policy objectives, but entrusting the the more cautious, thorough defense and foreign policy establishments with designing and implementing the plans needed to reach these goals.

Marshall's political side, however, chafed at the thought of being aligned with his neocon foes. On second thought, he wondered aloud, perhaps regime change isn't the such a great policy after all, if the Bushies were to the ones to do it. Thus, Marshall, like much of the liberal punditocracy, got behind the arguments of the neocons' internal opponents, the military brass and career diplomats who have fought a furious rear-guard action to thwart an invasion of Iraq. Here's Marshall, writing in Salon, in a piece on the civillian-military dispute over defense policy, discussing the neocon vision and the brass' (reasonable according to Marshall) response.

In the minds of these second-tier appointees, taking out Saddam Hussein is only part of a larger puzzle. Their grand vision of the Middle East goes something like this: Stage 1: Iraq becomes democratic. Stage 2: Reformers take over in Iran. That would leave the three powerhouses of the Middle East -- Turkey, Iraq and Iran -- democratic and pro-Western. Suddenly the Saudis wouldn't be just one more corrupt, authoritarian Arab regime slouching toward bin Ladenism. They'd be surrounded by democratic states that would undermine Saudi rule both militarily and ideologically.

As a plan to pursue in the real world, most of the career military and the civilian employees at the Pentagon -- indeed most establishment foreign policy experts -- see this vision as little short of insane. But to Bush's hawkish Pentagon appointees the real prize isn't Baghdad, it's Riyadh. And the Saudis know it.

Marshall accepts the "experts" opinion that the neocons are insane uncritically. Marshall is smart enought to realize that the military often defines the "possible" in light of their own agenda. However, he does not bring that insight to bear in this case. Sure, building a democratic Iraq will require a much greater commitment than simply ousting Saddam, but barring the racist notion that Arabs are incable of democratic rule how can it be considered impossible? Similarly, Marshall gives no reason why pessimism about Iranian reform is justified. Finally, and most disturbingly, Marshall seems to believe that the neocon strategic goal of limiting Saudi power and infuence, which is inextricably linked with radical Islamism, is misguided.

All of these critiques of the neocon program are understandable from a realist point of view. Realists believe that American power should be expended only to deter and destroy imminent security threats, not to be squandered on idealistic crusades such as spreading democracy to the Middle East. What is confusing, however, is hearing these arguments reflexed back from risk-adverse generals and diplomats by self-proclaimed liberals.

Marshall himself admits that the belief that military matters should just be left to the professionals is a flawed one. Still, he can not take the final step towards endorsing the neocons against the establishment.

But if the civilians themselves are hidebound ideologues, then much of the benefit of strong civilian control is lost. It's just the blind leading the blind. And in Iraq that could get us into a heap of trouble.

Of course, as Marshall himself has written, if we don't follow these ideologues into Iraq, we will be in far greater trouble. For that to happen, however, liberals must allow principle to trump politics. The legitimate liberal critique is the one Marshall presented in May - not whether to pursue the agenda of transforming the Middle East, but how to pursue it in a way that gives it the best chance of long-term success. Josh Marshall and other liberals who choose instead to back the realist establishment will find themselves in the end satisfying neither their hearts nor their heads.