WHY THE ROAD FROM 9/11 GOES THROUGH IRAQ

Earlier this month, Thomas Friedman wrote a column that cut to the heart of the Iraq debate, but has since continued to be ignored by all sides in the ongoing debate. His point was that the debate on Iraq, by framing curtailing proliferation as the essential goal and regime change as a debatable means had things upside down. Iraq skeptics are right to ask the question as to why the need to curtail Iraq's nonconvential arms production has radically changed in the past 13 months. One could easily argue that in the short term, terrorists are more likely to acquire nuclear capability from the decaying infrastructure of the former Soviet Union, or through Islamist elements in the Pakistani military. No, the more immediate lesson of 9/11 is that the status quo in the Arab-Islamic world - of corrupt, brutal dictatorships and Islamist counter-movements is unacceptable. The misery of millions is no longer containable - it has become globalized through Islamist terror. Radically changing this environment, therefore, is not just a moral obligation but the most crucial challenge for American and global security.

Iraq skeptics like to point out that the two fonts of Islamist terror, both theologically and financially, are Saudi Arabia and Iran. Saddam is at best a distant third player, with his offers to fund Palestinian terror and cheerleading of attacks on America. Neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran, however, are particularly good targets for an American policy of regime change. The Saudis have bought international prestige and influence with oil money. The diplomatic and economic hurdles towards removing the Saudi regime are formidable - and the absence of non-Islamist opposition palpable. Iran presents precisely the opposite problem - the existence of a grass-roots, democratic protest movement. Without a doubt, regime change in Iran should be an essential goal of American foreign policy. However, too much involvement on the side of the opposition could be counterproductive, allowing the mullahs to feed off a nationalist backlash. It is best for both America and Iran if the regime is toppled from within, giving a successor democratic government legitimacy. In contrast, Iraq is much better target - diplomatically isolated, economically marginalized, and relatively secular. The influence of a democratic, pro-Western Iraq would be enormous - an opportunity for cosmopolitan Islam to once more emanate from the historic seat of the caliphate.

The strategy of intializing a new order in the Arab-Islamic world through regime change in Iraq is not without its problems. Iraq is not an organic political entity, but a fractious collection of ethnic and religious groups fastened by British mapmakers and held together by despotic will. Nation-building is a long, arduous task that requires a long-term commitment. It is unclear whether the U.S. has the stamina or the world community the moral clarity required in this case. The problem with the Iraq skeptics is that they offer up these critiques without any constructive alternatives. The need to radically remake the political landscape of the Arab-Islamic world, making it hospital for democracy and inhospitable for Islamism, is no longer debatable aftermath of 9/11. Opposition to an invasion of Iraq can not rise beyond petty obstructionism unless it addresses this critical need, and presents a viable alternative.